Branch: Luftwaffe
Born: 10 October 1895 in Barzdorf, near Striegau, Germany.
Died: 12 July 1945 in Bad Ischl, Austria.
Ranks:
Generalfeldmarschall
16 February 1943
Generaloberst 1 February
1942
General der Flieger 19
July 1940
Generalleutnant
Generalmajor 1 November
1938
Oberst 23 January 1938
Oberstleutnant 20 April
1936
Major 1 June 1934
Hauptmann 1 February
1929
Oberleutnant 31 July
1925
Leutnant 19 June 1914
F�hnrich 22 March 1913
Decorations:
Commands:
Legion Condor
Takes command on
Ends command on
VIII. Fliegerkorps
Takes command on 19 July 1939
Ends command on 30 June 1942
Luftflotte 4
Takes command on 20 July 1942
Ends command on 4 September 1943
Luftflotte 2
Takes command on 12 June 1943
Ends command on 27 September 1944
Other: Personnel
Articles:
Dr.-Ing. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was born on 10 October
1895 in Gut Barzdorf, Silesia and was a German Generalfeldmarschall
(General Field Marshal) of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force)
during the Second World War. Born in 1895 to Prussian nobles,
Wolfram grew up in wealthy surroundings. After attending school
he opted to join the German Army at the age of 18, rather
than choose an academic career. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
joined the army's Cavalry arm in 1913.
On the outbreak of the First World War, Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen fought on the Western Front, winning the Iron Cross
Second Class. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was redeployed
to the Eastern Front in 1915, where Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'stayed
until 1917. The von Richthofen family produced several notable
personalities that would become famous during the First War.
His cousins, brothers Lothar and Manfred von Richthofen ,
both became flying aces and they encouraged him to join the
Luftstreitkräfte (German Imperial Air Service). Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen did so, and joined Manfred's Geschwader
(Wing), Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1). Manfred, known
as the Red Baron, was the highest claiming ace of the war
with 80 victories. On his first mission with his cousin, Manfred
was killed in April 1918. Wolfram continued flying, and went
on to claim eight aerial victories before the armistice in
November 1918. His other cousin, Lothar, survived the war,
but was killed in a flying accident in 1922.
After the war Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen resumed civilian
life and discharged himself from the army. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen studied Engineering at University before rejoining
the Reichswehr, the German armed forces in the Weimar Republic
era. In 1933
Adolf
Hitler and the National Socialists Party seized power
in Germany, and the Reichswehr was formed into the Wehrmacht.
Wolfram joined the new Luftwaffe. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'served
as part of the Legion Condor (Condor Legion) which supported
the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War. During this time, he
recognised the need for close air support in military campaigns.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen championed the dive bomber,
particularly the
Junkers
Ju 87 (
Stuka).
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen also believed in improving
ground-air communications, which was put into effect in the
Second World War, after his experiences in Spain and Poland.
The combination of effective air-ground communications, and
powerful concentrations of dive bombers would lead to personal
success for Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen in the first half
of the war. By 1941, a high standard of air to ground communications
became a uniform facility in the Luftwaffe.
When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen commanded a specialised ground-attack
air unit VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps), first as a small
action unit in the Polish Campaign, and then as full-sized
Air Corps in Western Europe, from May to June 1940. The effectiveness
of his units proved decisive at certain points in the French
Campaign, particularly covering the German thrust to the English
Channel. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was awarded the Knight's
Cross on 23 May 1940, in view of his achievements. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen continued in front-line service during
the Battle of Britain and Balkans Campaign in 1940 and 1941.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen achieved his greatest success
on the Eastern Front. In particular, he achieved notable success
in the Crimean Campaigns during 1942. Despite offering vital
tactical and operational support to Heeresgruppe Süd
(Army Group South), after the defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad
he was moved to the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, where
he commanded Luftwaffe forces in the Italian Campaign. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen remained in active service until late
1944, when he was retired on medical grounds. Soon after the
capitulation of Germany in May 1945, he was taken prisoner
by the United States Army, but died in captivity of a brain
tumour on 12 July that same year.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was born on 10 October 1895,
at the Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen Barzdorf estate (Gut
Barzdorf), near Striegau, Lower Silesia to an aristocratic
family. His father, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen 1856 to
1922, and mother, Therese Gotz von Olenhusen 1862 to 1948
were of Silesian nobility, and the family had been nobles
for 350 years prior to Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's existence.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was second child and oldest
son of four children. His older sister, Sophie-Therese was
born in 1891 and died in 1971. His brother Manfred was born
in 1898 and Gerhard in 1902. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was the fourth cousin of the German World War I flying ace
Manfred von Richthofen , popularly known as the Red Baron,
and the baron's younger brother Lothar von Richthofen. As
the son of a noble, he enjoyed a life of privilege. The family's
noble status dated back to the 1500s, and by the 1700s the
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's owned 16 estates in Lower
Silesia. When Frederick the Great annexed Silesia in 1740,
he personally granted the title of Baron (Freiherr) to one
of Richthofen's ancestors. The family continued on in Silesia
for a further three generations.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's home, an eighteenth century
estate, was only one of 25 Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
owned properties totalling 140 square kilometres. Barzdorf,
where Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen lived, was a modest
350 hectares, of which 269 was cropland and the rest forest.
Interestingly Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, as the oldest
son did not inherit the estate. Instead, on the death of his
father in 1922, it was given to his younger brother, Manfred.
Some years before, Wolfram's uncle General of Cavalry Manfred
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen , his father's brother, had
asked him to inherit his estate to keep it in the family,
as he himself had no children. Wolfram inherited the estate
after Manfred legally adopted him. The General did not die
until 1939, having lived long enough to see his nephew win
success in the Spanish Civil War and in the Polish Campaign.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had a distant relationship
with his youngest brother, but a close one with Manfred. Unlike
most Prussian nobles Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen went
to the local Gymnasium (academic high school) and did not
have private tutors at home. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
attended school in Striegau. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
grades at Mathematics and German language were good, but he
did not excel at foreign languages (in which he scored average
to poor results. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen found studying
language to be boring, but did learn Italian and could converse
competently in it in later life.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen became good friends with his
cousins, Lothar and Manfred Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
, and he hunted game at the estate with them regularly. By
the end of his teens Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had become
an established hunter and horse rider interests which remained
with him for the rest of his life. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
enjoyed being outdoors and, while still at school, opted to
apply for a commission in the German Army rather than choose
an academic career.
In 1913, at the age of 18, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
joined the army and took the officer course in Berlin. The
Cavalry was the most prestigious arm, and Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen applied to join the 4th Hussars which belonged
to the 12th Cavalry Brigade of the VI Army Corps (VI. Armeekorps)
in Breslau. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen did not have much
time to experience peacetime military service. In August 1914
the First World War began.
On 18 September 1920, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen married
Jutta von Selchow March 1896 to 1991 at a Lutheran church
Breslau (now the city of Wroclaw in Poland). They had been
introduced by her brother Gunther. Jutta was also of Silesian
nobility, and had moved in the same circles. She had served
as a nurse in the war. They lived in an apartment in Hanover
while Wolfram restarted his academic career in Engineering.
During their marriage they rarely travelled abroad in the
1920s. In the 1930s they took Skiing holidays in Switzerland.
The couple had three children Wolfram born 25 May 1922, Götz
27 November 1925 and Ellen 15 February 1928
World War One
The Hussars of the 12th Cavalry Brigade were attached to the
5th Cavalry Division, which was subordinated to the First
Cavalry Corps. It formed part of the German 3. Armee (3rd
Army) that enacted the attack on France and Belgium in August
1914 as part of the pre-war Schlieffen Plan. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen crossed the Meuse river at Dinant. It was involved
in heavy action against the French VIII Cavalry Corps and
fought in Belgium at Namur on 23-24 August and again at St.
Quentin. The 5th Cavalry continued its drive into France after
the Battle of the Frontiers, but was stopped at the First
Battle of the Marne in September. In recognition for bravery
in combat, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was awarded the
Iron Cross Second Class 1914 on 21 September 1914. The modern
combat environment damaged the effectiveness of cavalry, and
thus Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's division was transferred
to the Eastern Front, in Poland that November.
On the Eastern Front, the Cavalry Division was mostly deployed
in the south. Little combat took place, as the German army
did not use cavalry as frequently. The division was kept mainly
in reserve. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's brigade served
near Pinsk in 1916, and the division would spend late 1915
to January 1917 of defensive operations in the Pripet Marshes.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was made commander of the
horse depot of the Brigade in the autumn, 1916 and was promoted
to Squadron Commander, with 160 men under his command. This
was never going to garner him the level of fame his cousins,
Lothar and Manfred, were now achieving in the Luftstreitkräfte
(Imperial Air Service). They personally encouraged him to
join as an airman. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen finally
did so in June 1917.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen transferred to the Luftstreitkräfte
14th Flying Replacement Regiment based at Halle, one of several
large flight schools. At this point in the war, German training
was more thorough and longer than the British' Royal Flying
Corps (RFC), and at least equal to that given by Armee de
l'Air and United States Army Air Service (USAAS). His training
lasted three months, and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was
assigned to the 11th Flying Replacement Battalion for advanced
training in March 1918. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen reported
to his cousin Manfred's unit, Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1) on the
4 April 1918. On his first mission with his cousin, Manfred
was killed in April 1918. Wolfram continued flying, and went
on to claim eight aerial victories before the armistice in
November 1918.
Between the wars
Academia and Reichswehr
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'studied aeronautical engineering
from 1919 to 1922 at the Technical University of Hanover.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen served in Rome in 1929-1931
as an informal air attache in violation of the disarmament
clauses of the Versailles Treaty.
Wehrmacht
In 1933 Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen joined the Luftwaffe,
commanded by his former commanding officer at JG 1, in 1918,
Hermann
Göring. By 1934 Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was
in charge of developing and testing new aircraft in the Technisches
Amt, under the overall direction of
Ernst
Udet. Although Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had known
Hermann
Göring, having served under him in the First World
War in JG 1, the two did not get along. They both came from
aristocratic backgrounds, but Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was a Silesian from Lower Silesia, a drive commander, a good
and hard working staff officer who enjoyed the company of
engineers and like-minded men.
Hermann
Göring was a Bavarian, and a playboy who enjoyed
talking about First World War stories and his time as an ace
while he enjoyed the trappings of power.
Hermann
Göring preferred men like him, and promoted them
on that basis. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen overlooked
the more qualified Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen in favour
of
Ernst
Udet, a hard drinker and playboy, who like
Hermann
Göring had grown up in Bavaria, to head the Technisches
Amt.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's role was mainly concerned
with aircraft procurement programs for the fledgling Luftwaffe.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was involved in the development
of types such as the
Dornier
Do 23,
Heinkel
He 111 and
Junkers
Ju 86. In the event, only the
He 111 would make a real impact during the war. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was following a considerably difficult
assignment, stemming from a directive issued to the Reichswehr
before
Adolf
Hitler's rise to power. In July 1932, the Reichswehr had
been pursuing the Schnellbomber (fast bomber) concept. The
need for modern and fast bombers was to meet the future vision
of air warfare for bombers that were faster than fighter aircraft.
As the 1930s progressed the
He
111 was refined, and the
Dornier
Do 17 Schnellbomber entered planning, production and service
in 1936 to 1937. Even so,
Hermann
Göring as still interested in the heavy bomber program,
which would give the Luftwaffe a firm strategic bombing capability.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was dubious about the employment
of heavy bombers, and wanted the projects developing types
like the
Dornier
Do 19 cancelled. Unfortunately for Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen , for the time being, the Luftwaffe's first Chief
of the General Staff, Walther Wever, did believe in the heavy
bomber program. The development of what Walther Wever called
the Ural bomber designs continued. At the time,
Hermann
Göring and Walther Wever also required a long-range
fighter escort design for protecting the bombers over Britain
and the Soviet Union, Germany's expected enemies. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen joined Walther Wever in moderating
some of the design requests of
Hermann
Göring, who insisted on a fast, fighter, bomber,
ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft rolled into one
design. However, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen used his
position to split the specification into separate designs
on 22 January 1935, viewing the request as impossible.
Walther Wever was killed in an air accident in June 1936 and
the emphasis shifted back to more affordable (in manpower
and material terms) medium bombers. After Walther Wever's
death,
Hermann
Göring and
Ernst
Udet became more active in the development programs.
Ernst
Udet favoured the close support designs, such as the
Junkers
Ju 87 (
Stuka)
dive bomber, while
Hermann
Göring favoured having more medium bombers rather
than a small number of heavy bombers. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen did not get along with
Ernst
Udet, and did not believe in his ideas about dive bombing.
Ernst
Udet, much like
Hermann
Göring, favoured combining the qualities of aircraft.
Ernst
Udet sought out a design that could dog fight, dive bomb
and carry out level bombing, much like
Hermann
Göring had requested. This was at odds with Wolfram's
fundamental desire for aircraft that were easy to mass produce
and designed for, and to excel at, specialised tasks.
Although Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had managed to prevent
aircraft design from heading into mediocrity, and kept them
specialised for particular tasks,
Ernst
Udet still influenced the selection of the multipurpose
Messerschmitt
Bf 110 and the Schnellbomber designed
Junkers
Ju 88 by the end of 1936. With the
Ju
88, he insisted it have a dive bombing capability, though
it was more suited to, and ideal for, the level bombing Schnellbomber
concept. By the autumn, 1936, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
decided he had had enough of working with
Ernst
Udet, whose ideas he thought were totally wrong. With
an expanding Luftwaffe and a civil war starting in Spain,
an opportunity came for a field command.
Spanish Civil War
Innovation and experiences
In November 1936, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen left the
staff to take a field command in the Legion Condor (Condor
Legion), a Luftwaffe contingent sent to support General Francisco
Franco's Fascists in the Spanish Civil War.
Ernst
Udet continued with the dive bomber concept and the Ju
87 first saw action under Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
's command in Spain. Wolfram retained his position as Head
of Development, but he was now tasked with the evaluation
of aircraft under operational conditions. His role expanded
in January 1937, and he became Chief of Staff to Hugo Sperrle,
who was to command the Legion.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's experiences were to serve
the Luftwaffe well in the long-term. His own learning curve
in the war highlighted several issues that a modern air force
would have to overcome. The most important issues concerned
tactical and operational level warfare. Unlike the Italian
officers from the Regia Aeronautica, the Germans put a great
deal of effort into developing close support doctrine. Tactically,
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen found little need to retain
anti-aircraft artillery to defend airfields. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen pushed Flak units into the front line to bolster
the artillery units. Rapid fire 20 mm calibres and 88 mm weapons
were first used in Spain. Their effectiveness was reported
to Berlin. Soon this tactic became part of Luftwaffe doctrine.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was pleased with his idea,
and the knowledge the Flak theorists in Berlin were not happy
about using air defence artillery in the ground battle.
Another tactical consideration led to operational innovation.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen adopted the shuttle air tactic.
In order to maximise support over the front line, aircraft
operated from bases near the front to keep and gain an advantage.
It was very successful in the 1937 battles. Aircraft were
sent in small formations to bomb front line positions, while
other groups of ground attack aircraft were en route and refuelling.
This way a constant air presence was maintained over the battlefield
which eroded the effectiveness and morale of the enemy. In
order for this to able to work effectively, three or more
sorties needed to be flown per day. This required a large
number of personnel to set up and man forward airfields. The
Luftwaffe's logistics units had to be completely motorised
to bring in fuel, ammunition and spare parts. The logistics
units had the opportunity to be tested under tough conditions.
These tactics and operational methods were employed during
Battle of Bilbao, which defeated the Republican forces in
the north of Spain. The motorised logistics also helped during
the rapid redeployment to the south, after the surprise Republican
offensive at Brunete in July 1937. The air support was vital
in defeating the offensive, which was supported by modern
aircraft sent to the Republicans from the Soviet Union. German
types like the
Messerschmitt
Bf 109 fighter, which replaced the
Heinkel
He 51, the
Do
17 and
He
111 helped win and hold air superiority and interdict
the battlefield, which decisively stopped the attack. The
Republican's had spent most of their Gold reserves on buying
Soviet equipment. With most of that equipment used up, the
Legion Condor (Condor Legion) and Nationalists would have
the technological edge.
The most difficult aspect of close support was communication.
Air-ground liaison officers had been used since 1935, when
the Luftwaffe first set up a training program for this purpose.
By 1937, precise procedures had yet to be worked through for
air to ground coordination Staff officers were trained to
solve operational problems, and the lack of doctrine and reluctance
of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air
Force) to micromanage gave Hugo Sperrle and Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen a free hand to devise solutions. Aircraft could
not communicate with the front-line Instead they could communicate
via radio with each other and their home base. One of the
first innovations was to prepare signals staff on the front
line in the region of any planned air strikes, and equip them
with telephones. The forward officers could telephone the
base with updates, who in turn could radio the aircraft. It
became an important standard operational practice. Liaison
officers were attached to the Nationalist Army, and improved
coordination continued in the second half of 1937 despite
occasional friendly-fire incidents. In the Second World War,
the Luftwaffe air units and liaison officers at the front
could communicate directly with updated radios.
German air doctrine also led the way in transportation capability.
The Legion Condor (Condor Legion), with the chief of staff's
input, had proven logistics could be helped using air transports.
By 1939, it would have the largest, and most capable transport
service in the World.
The Luftwaffe entered the Second World War with high standards
of training. Although other air forces also had training programs
and pilots equal to the Germans, the Luftwaffe emphasised
training its large units, the Geschwader (Wings), Corps and
Luftflotten (Air Fleet) staffs in large-scale manoeuvres with
the army in the pre-war years. War games, communication exercises
in a different variety of combat operations allowed the officers
to familiarise themselves with mobile warfare, and it gave
way to proficient doctrine and better prepared operational
methods than most of its opponents. With notable exceptions,
such as RAF Fighter Command, most of the Allied air forces
did not conduct large-scale unit and staff exercises, testing
tactics and doctrine. Given the slight numerical and technological
advantage of the Luftwaffe over its enemies in 1939-1941,
its success during these years can largely be attributed to
extensive officer and staff training programs along with the
experiences of the Legion Condor (Condor Legion) in Spain
Bombing of Guernica
During the Spanish Civil War the Legion Condor (Condor Legion)
bombed Guernica. Soon afterwards, and even in modern day studies,
historians referred to it as a deliberate act of terror bombing
designed to break civilian morale. Yet there is no evidence
in German air doctrine, or in German battle plans to suggest
Guernica was targeted to break Basque civilian morale. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen , who planned the raid, did not know
much about Guernica. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was unaware
there were Basque parliamentary buildings in the city, a fact
which he did not know until he toured the city on 30 April,
after Franco's Nationalists captured it.
There is much debate as to why it was bombed. One simple,
and possible reason for Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'sanctioning
the bombing, was that two main roads were being used to supply
23 Basque battalions at Bilbao intersected at Guernica. At
least the 18th Loyala and Saseta battalions were stationed
in the city at the time, making it a legitimate target. If
the town was fortified (which it was not), it would have made
a major obstacle to the Nationalist advance, which would be
unable to pass beyond the town. If Guernica was levelled,
the roads and train lines, as well as the bridges, would deny
the enemy an escape route and also deny them the ability to
evacuate heavy equipment. Another mitigating factor was the
alleged poor accuracy of German bomb sights (which were the
best in the world at that time) in early 1937. On that basis,
unable to hit targets with precision, apologists argue, carpet
bombing was the only realistic option. In the event, from
a purely military perspective, it was a success, closing the
city to traffic for 24 hours. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
regarded at a technical success, but was disappointed the
Nationalists did not follow it up quickly, missing a chance
to cut off large portions of the enemy forces. The casualty
rates among modern sources suggest the civilian deaths were
between 200-600, not the 1,600-2'000 as claimed by the Basque
and German Governments.
While there is no documentary evidence to show that Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen ever adopted terror bombing against
cities, he was a ruthless commander who never expressed any
sympathy or concern for civilians who might be located in
the vicinity of the military target. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen's attitude on this subject did not change throughout
the Second World War.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen and Hugo Sperrle made an effective
team in Spain. Hugo Sperrle was an experienced officer, and
was intelligent with a good reputation. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen was considered a good leader in combat. They combined
to disagree with Franco on a number of topics and debates
could become heated. Both men were blunt, and although the
Germans and Spanish did not like each other, they had a healthy
respect which translated into an effective working relationship.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen even learned a little Spanish
and Italian, an effort appreciated by Nationalist officers.
After Hugo Sperrle returned to Germany, Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen assumed command of the Legion Condor (Condor Legion).
Helmuth Volkman assumed his place, but his pessimistic reports
to Berlin, continued demands for support and resources, and
disagreements with Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen meant he
was replaced by Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen in October
1938, possibly at the request of the Nationalists. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was promoted to the rank of Generalmajor
on 1 November 1938. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen oversaw
the final stages of the war, as the Nationalists defeated
the Republican Spanish in early 1939. By this time, his belief
in the
Junkers
Ju 87 (
Stuka)
was cemented. His earlier views about low-flying aircraft
suffering unacceptably high losses were ill-founded. It had
proved highly successful in its limited role and air superiority
had contributed much to the success of the final battles.
Second World War
Polish Campaign
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen commanded Fliegerführer
z.b.V. (zur besonderen Verwendung for special deployment)
during the Invasion of Poland, which began on 1 September
1939, starting the war in Europe. This unit was a tactical
formation, and was attached to 2. Fliegerdivision (2nd Flying
Division), under the joint command of Bruno Loerzer and
Alexander
Löhr. The operational goal of Fliegerführer
z.b.V., was to support the 10. Armee (10th Army), under the
command of anglophile
Walter
von Reichenau, who Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen met
shortly before the campaign. The army contained the majority
of the motorised and armoured units and was to form the focus
point, or Schwerpunkt of the offensive against Poland.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's order of battle included
a powerful concentration of strike aircraft. The formation
had its headquarters at Birkental-Oppeln, but its units were
spread out. Schlosswalden was home to 1.(F)/AufklGr 124, a
reconnaissance unit which operated
Dornier
Do 17P aircraft. Lehrgeschwader 2 (Learning Wing 2), was
based at Nieder-Ellguth, while the bulk of Sturzkampfgeschwader
77 (Dive Bombing Wing 77 or StG 77), which operated the
Junkers
Ju 87 (
Stuka),
was based at Neudorf. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen also
commanded Slovak Air Force units (Slovenske Vzousne Zbrane)
the 38th and 48th Fighter Squadrons and 16th Corps Squadron.
On the first day of the offensive StG 77 was committed to
counter-air operations, striking Polish Air Force (PAF) bases.
The need for counter-air operations left only Major Werner
Speilvogel's II.(Schlacht)/LG 2 to close support operations.
The unit supported the German mechanised XVI. Armeekorps (16th
Army Corps). Along with other units, Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen's I./StG 77 decimated a Polish Cavalry Brigade
of Armii Lódz during the Battle of Lódz.
Only eight days into the campaign, on 8 September, the 10.
Armee (10th Army) had advanced so far into Poland, Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was obliged to move Geschwaderkommodore
(Wing Commander) Günter Schwartzkopff's StG 77 into Polish
airfields while
Walter
von Reichenau closed in on Warsaw. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen was able to keep logistical elements functioning,
which kept units flying three sorties per day. At the end
of the first week of September, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
's battle group was transferred to Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet
4) without any problems. The supply of spare parts, ammunition
and fuel were flown in by a large transport fleet of
Junkers
Ju 52s. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had practised
with air transport extensively in peacetime.
The fast moving front line meant that army headquarters lost
touch with their forward units. The collapse of communications
deprived commanders and squadrons of orders, a situation exacerbated
by the lack of a common radio frequency and over-stretched
logistics, which also forced them to scavenge enemy supply
depots. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was the most effected.
As early as the 3 September, he noted in his diary that the
army headquarters had ceased to know where the front line
was, and he refused to respond to army requests of air support.
Instead he responded according to his own interpretation of
the situation. This method did cause friendly fire incidents.
On one occasion,
Ju
87s knocked out a bridge across the Vistula river when
a Panzer Division was about to cross.
The air-ground coordination was the responsibility of Kolufts,
who synthesised data from their own aerial reconnaissance
and forward units, but they were only advisors, and had little
experience in air warfare. They were controlled by the army
(Nahaufklarungsstaffeln). The depended on the Luftwaffe's
Air Liaison Officer (Fliegerverbindungsstaffeln or Flivo)
for fighter or bomber support. However, Flivo units were responsible
to the Luftwaffe, not the army, and their role was to keep
air commanders informed of the situation through the use of
radio-equipped vehicles.
Bruno Loerzer confessed he was out of contact with
Walter
von Reichenau's command post for three days, while Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was soon complaining to
Alexander
Löhr about the formers ignorance. Because he was
impetuous and wanted to be in the thick of the action, Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen began flying around over the front
line in a
Fieseler
Fi 156 (
Storch)
as air-ground liaison collapsed. His claims were not always
believed, and these personal operations were a waste of time,
which needlessly exposed him to danger. Indeed, Major Spielvogel
was shot down over Warsaw in his
Storch
on 9 September, and killed. While the operational situation
was not good,
Alexander
Löhr took command of Fliegerführer z.b.V. giving
the unit virtual autonomy and allowing Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen to build a personal empire of six Gruppen (Groups).
By the 11 September, the fuel situation was acute and logistics
failed. On the first day his units were flying three missions
every day, now it was reduced to one per day. Despite the
problems, by 8 September Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was
preparing an assault on Warsaw for which he received Heinrich
Seybald's Kampfgeschwader 77 (KG 77). The raids had barely
begun when a major threat developed behind him. A Polish counter
offensive engaged the German 8. Armee (8th Army), in an attempt
to reach the Vistula river. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
joined the assault and counter attack from the air. For three
days the Germans bombed Polish forces. In the resulting Battle
of Radom and Battle of the Bzura, which further Polish attacks
were made, were won. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'sent
his air units up under orders to spend only 10 minutes over
the battlefield, and to expend all ammunition. Polish forces
sought refuge in the forests nearby, but were smoked out by
incendiaries. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's men flew 750
sorties and dropped 388 tons of bombs. The air action destroyed
remaining resistance, allowing the army to mop up.
The threat from the Polish generated calls for attacks on
Warsaw. This had been planned for the first day, codenamed
Wasserkante, or Operation Seaside. Just after midnight on
12/13 September, the Luftwaffe chief of staff Hans Jeschonnek,
ordered
Alexander
Löhr to prepare to attack Ghettos in northern Warsaw,
in retaliation for unspecified war crimes against German soldiers
in recent battles. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's airmen
flew 183 to 197 sorties, dropping a 50/50 mixture of high
explosive and incendiaries. Some bombs fell close to German
forces, conducting the Siege of Warsaw, while smoke made impossible
to assess damage. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen confronted
Hermann
Göring over the need for a united air command for
the Warsaw campaign, and hinted he was the man for the job.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen did not get his way until
the 21 September. Weather delayed the attack, which began
on 22 September. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen did not get
the aircraft he wanted for the operation, in particular the
Heinkel
He 111, and instead was handed old
Junkers
Ju 52 transports, which delivered bombs by airmen throwing
them out of the doors. His
Ju
87s were also banned from using bomb loads greater than
50 kg. On 22 September, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
command flew 620 sorties. German air units dropped 560 tonnes
of high explosive and 72 tonnes of incendiaries. The bombing
did great damage, causing 40,000 casualties and destroying
10 per cent of buildings in the city. Only two
Ju
87s and a Ju 52 was lost. The army complained near friendly
fire incidents and smoke made life difficult for German artillery.
Adolf Hitler,
despite the complaints, ordered the bombing to continue. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen's force flew 450 against Modlin, securing
its surrender on the 27 September after 318 tonnes of bombs
been dropped on it in two days. Warsaw surrendered soon afterwards,
and the campaign was declared over after the Polish surrender
on 6 October 1939.
Western Europe
The invasion of Poland prompted the United Kingdom and France
to declare war on Germany. Through the winter, 1939 to 1940,
the Wehrmacht began preparations to invade the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Belgium, and France. The basic plan called for
an invasion of the Netherlands, by Heeresgruppe B (Army Group
B), and Belgium by Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) and Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A). The operation, Case Yellow, was designed
to suck in the Allied armies into the Low Countries, and then
breakout through the Ardennes in southern Belgium and Luxembourg,
and advance to the English Channel to encircle and destroy
them.
Originally, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's force had retained
its original name, Fliegerfuhrer zbV, after Poland, but then
was renamed 8. Fliegerdivision (8th Flying Division) on 1
October, but days later, it was given Corps status. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was given command of the unit, now
a specialist ground-attack Corps, VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th
Flying Corps). Most of the Geschwader involved were based
at Cologne and Dusseldorf. Included in the order of battle,
was Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27), equipped with
Messerschmitt
Bf 109s, KG 77, equipped with
Dornier
Do 17s, Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) and StG 77, equipped
with
Ju 87
Stuka, and
LG 2, equipped with
Ju
87s,
Bf
109s,
Ju
88s and
He
111s. The Corps was a purpose-built ground attack organisation.
By 10 May, the order of battle had changed. Only one Gruppe
(Group) of LG 2 remained, III.(Schlacht). IV.(St)./Lehrgeschwader
1 (LG 1), with
Ju
87s were added, as was I.Sturzkampfgeschwader 76 (StG
76).
The task of Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen varied. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was to support
Walter
von Reichenau's German 6. Armee (6th Army) in Belgium
and
Ewald
von Kleist's XXXXI. Panzerkorps (41st Panzer Corps) and
XIX. Armeekorps (19th Army Corps). During the Phoney War period
he established his headquarters at Koblenz on 18 October 1939
and thereafter, his Corps steadily rose in strength, from
46 Staffeln (Squadrons), 27 of them
Ju
87 units, to 59 by the end of the month. In December,
he was first assigned to support
Walter
von Reichenau. Attacks on enemy air bases were only to
be carried out if Allied air power attempted to interdict
the German ground forces. Ground support was the first priority.
This was reflected in VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) order
of battle which contained six
Ju
87 Gruppen (Groups, of 30 aircraft). V. Fliegerkorps (5th
Air Corps) had the primary counter-air role and was positioned
close to the front to provide air superiority support. But
when a breakthrough took place, it was to exchange airfields
with VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps), to allow for effective
air support to the army. However, the Corps' war diary and
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's personal diary make no mention
of this order, which may indicate a breakdown in staff work
at some level.
What did not breakdown was communication. Operationally, the
air division and corps headquarters were placed alongside,
and moved with, army equivalents. The air liaison teams attached
to the corps and Panzer Divisions were directed to report
the battle situation at the front, but were forbidden to advise
the army, or request air support. The army sent separate reports,
under the same conditions. The reports were digested by
Ewald
von Kleist and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's chiefs
of staff, and action was or was not taken with mutual agreement.
Attack orders could be delivered in minutes to air units.
A Guppe (Group) of
Ju
87s and
Bf
109s was ready in reserve to respond, and could do so
within 45 to 70 minutes. VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps)
and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen were led to believe they
would spend the entire campaign supporting
Walter
von Reichenau in northern Belgium, but the Oberkommando
der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air Force) did not inform
the Corps that it was going to be used in a Meuse river breakthrough.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen knew
Walter
von Reichenau, and they had a close working relationship.
During the planning for the 6. Armee (6th Army) operations,
Walter
von Reichenau seemed to display a lack of interest when
the subject turned to the capture of the bridges at Maastricht,
in the Netherlands, and Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium. The defeat
and or capture of these objectives were essential for the
6. Armee (6th Army) to advance into the Low Countries. So
unenthusiastic was
Walter
von Reichenau by the suggested airborne operation by glider
troops against the fort, he refused to allow the diversion
of any artillery. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'supplied
a Flak battalion, Flakgruppe Aldinger, for the task of supporting
them.
Battle of the Netherlands
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen found himself under pressure
in other sectors on the 10 May, the first day of the offensive.
In the early phase of the Battle of the Netherlands, the Fallschirmjäger
paratrooper forces had been tasked with capturing The Hague
and the Dutch Royal Family. In the subsequent Battle for The
Hague, German forces met heavy resistance. The French Seventh
Army was also advancing through Belgium into the Netherlands
near the Hague, increasing the threat in a situation which
was getting out of control. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was ordered to throw in half of his force in the Hague battle
and attack the Scheldt estuary, near Antwerp, Belgium, on
the Dutch border to stop the French Army before it took up
position on the Dutch Moerdijk bridgehead. Despite thick cloud,
I. and III./Kampfgeschwader 4 (KG 4) and Kampfgeschwader 54
(KG 54), along with Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
Ju
87s, drove the French back preventing them from supporting
the Dutch at The Hague.
Battle of Belgium
VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) had to turn its attention
to supporting
Walter
von Reichenau, in the Battle of Belgium. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen provided direct and indirect support to the
German 6. Armee (6th Army), in particular, to
Erich
Hoepner's XVI. Armeekorps (16th Army Corps), part of the
6. Armee (6th Army). His losses were light. Just 12
Ju
87s were lost, anti-aircraft fire accounted for six I./StG
76 machines. His support operations were usually 65 kilometres
ahead of the forward edge of the battlefield, with even reconnaissance
aircraft pressed into service as bombers. Army units carried
flares and Swastika flags to prevent friendly fire incidents.
A major battle took place on 12 May 1940.
Erich
Hoepner's Corps confronted René Prioux's Corps
de Cavalerie during the Battle of Hannut. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's forces proved effective against French armour
during the battle. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen also provided
much needed support for the 3. Panzer-Division (3rd Panzer
Division) and 4. Panzer-Division (4th Panzer Division), which
were heavily engaged on the 13-14 May. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen also supported the German divisions a day or so
later, at the Battle of Gembloux Gap.
For the cost of 12 aircraft (four
Ju
87s), he helped attack French communication and supply
positions, and supported
Walter
von Reichenau as he reached the Dyle river. At that time,
he had moved into the Netherlands, at a Hotel, near Maastricht.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had a basic room, with a bath
that did not work. In the afternoon, he received an order
to cease operations in Belgium, and send all he had to support
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt's XLI Armeekorps, north of Sedan. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen was incredulous, and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
had to move his entire infrastructure 100 kilometres to the
south. The failure of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High
Command of the Air Force) to inform him he was to support
the breakthrough is difficult to explain. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen later noted in his diary that it was a major
oversight for the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command
of the Air Force) not to have informed him of his expected
input, but his diary also suggests he relished the fog of
war and the unknown. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen forces
were split, with LG 1 and StG 2 continuing support in Belgium,
while most were moved south. During the winding down of operations
in the north, his units did help the 6. Armee (6th Army) capture
Liege in Belgium on 17 May.
Battle of France
The most notable actions of his Corps took place during the
Battle of Sedan. By this time, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
had moved into St Trond-Liege in Belgium. The heavy German
air assaults on French positions included 360 by his medium
bombers, although his
Ju
87 units could only fly 90 owing to the difficulties he
had moving his Corps around. The Germans captured Sedan and
crossed the Meuse river, which would enable Heeresgruppe A
(Army Group A) to continue to the English Channel. On 14 May
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's JG 27 helped defend the
bridgehead from Allied air attacks. Allied bomber strength
was decimated. During the battle Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'suffered
a personal blow. Günter Schwartzkopff, Geschwaderkommodore
of StG 77, was killed when his
Ju
87 was hit by ground fire. Günter Schwartzkopff was
one of the founding members of the German dive-bomber arm
and had specialised knowledge on the method of attack. Günter
Schwartzkopff had been ordered not to engage in combat, as
he was too valuable to lose, but on 13 May he ignored orders.
He was one of the very few German aerial casualties over Sedan.
Thereafter, events move quickly. After the German breakthrough
at Sedan Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen asked that VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) be allowed to support
Ewald
von Kleist to the sea. One of the motivating reasons for
this was the gap which had developed between the Panzer Divisions
and infantry divisions struggling to catch up. Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A) had wanted the Panzers to slow down, to allow
the infantry to cover their flanks and rear, but
Heinz
Guderian ignored orders and continued on to the Channel
under the pretext of a reconnaissance in force. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen convinced
Hermann
Göring to help press for the Panzers to continue,
while his air Corps provided an aerial flank. It proved a
wise decision. StG 2 and 77
Ju
87s broke up attacks on the flanks of Heeresgruppe A (Army
Group A), most notably combining to repulse Charles de Gaulle's
Fourth Armoured Division on 16 and 19 May, at Montcornet,
Aisne and Crécy-sur-Serre. This effectively decimated
the remaining core of the French 9. Armee (9th Army), through
air power. Excellent ground-to-air communications throughout
the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could
call upon the
Stuka
and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis
of advance. In some cases the Luftwaffe responded to requests
in 10-20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's Chief of Staff said that never again was
such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning
joint operations achieved.
Still, for him personally, there were problems. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen moved his HQ to Ochamps to keep up with events,
while he gambled on German air superiority holding out to
fill forward airfields up with aircraft leading to overcrowding.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen also had communication difficulties,
and flew around in his
Storch
to organise air support for the army. Hugo Sperrle, chief
of Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) arrived at the same HQ, disrupting
staff work and leading Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen to
explode with rage. The pressures compelled him to risk being
shot down in order to pass on orders, and while flying on
22 May he was forced to land owing to a fractured fuel tank.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen organised support for
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt and covered
Heinz
Guderian's Corps, with KG 77, StG 77 and JG 27. While
he complained about communication, by the standards of the
day, it was efficient. The radio-equipped forward liaison
officers assigned VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) new targets,
while leaving less important orders to land line officers.
The
Ju 87s
were on 20 minute alert, and within 45 to 75 minutes they
were diving onto their targets. In some cases, they were able
to respond in 10 minutes. By 21 May, with his fighters based
at Charleville,
Ju
87s at St Trond, and his
Do
17s back in Germany, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
logistics were overstretched and his fuel was running out.
By 21 May the Allied armies were encircled and counter attacks
had been repulsed at Arras. The Allies were evacuating the
ports of Dunkirk and Calais. During the Battle of Dunkirk
and Siege of Calais (1940), Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'supported
the advance of Army Groups A and B. However, they were frequently
meeting Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters, flying across the
Channel. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen noted RAF Fighter
Command and its No. 11 Group RAF were responsible for 25 per
cent of German losses. On 22 May, StG 77 lost five
Ju
87s, indicating increased difficulty. Hugo Sperrle asked
for support and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen helped capture
Calais and was awarded the Knight's Cross on 23 May. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was ordered to support the German
Fourth Army, though he showed little interest in the Dunkirk
battles. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen regarded them as
a waste of time, and they disrupted preparations against southern
France (Case Red). Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen believed
the attempt to destroy Allied forces, or prevent the evacuation
with the Luftwaffe was unrealistic. Over Dunkirk, losses were
heavy and progress slow. On 26 May, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
made a special effort to gain and hold air superiority. Overall,
German air power failed to prevent the evacuation.
After the expulsion of the British Army and the surrenders
of the Dutch and Belgians, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was ordered to support the German 9. Armee (9th Army), containing
Heinz
Guderian's Corps. The battles were swift. The French lost
their most capable formations in the encirclement, and they
capitulated on 22 June 1940, after the capture of Paris on
14th, and the encirclement of the Maginot Line on 15 June.
Battle of Britain
Channel battles
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen continued, after the French
capitulation to command VIII. Fliegerkorps during the Battle
of Britain. The British refusal to reach a compromise with
Germany forced the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command
of the Air Force) to prepare a plan for attaining air superiority,
codenamed Operation Eagle Attack. Should this have been successful,
the Wehrmacht may have launched an invasion of Britain, codenamed
Operation Sea Lion.
For the first time, the Luftwaffe was engaged in an offensive
air war without the support of the German Army. Despite Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps being primarily a specialist
ground assault organisation, which supported ground forces,
he was expected to help lead the assault over Britain. His
Stuka units
were the best precision attack aircraft in the Luftwaffe and
their 500 kg bombs were capable of sinking merchant shipping,
and or seriously damaging warships. In June 1940, Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen and his Corps' specific mission was
to establish air superiority over the southern part of the
English Channel (near France) and to clear British shipping
from the strip of sea altogether, particularly from the region
between Portsmouth and Portland. VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air
Corps) had a particular advantage British fighters did not
have enough radar warning and were operating at the limits
of their range. This gave his
Ju
87s a near-free hand in operations.
In July 1940, skirmishes took place, between Luftflotte 2
(Air Fleet 2), under
Albert
Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet
3) on one side, and Group Captain Keith Park's No. 11 Group
RAF of Fighter Command on the other. The initial battles revolved
around the British southern coast. Attempts by German air
fleets to interdict British shipping in the English Channel
were met with a significance response from the RAF, and many
air battles ensued over the Channel. They were referred to
by the Germans as the Channel battles. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen made use of his
Dornier
Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft to locate convoys. When
located, he usually dispatched a Gruppe (30 aircraft) to engage
the convoy, holding other
Stuka
Gruppen (Groups) back for repeat attacks. The campaign was
complicated by the weather, which grounded the Corps for long
periods, and while the
Ju
87s proved effective, they proved vulnerable to RAF fighters.
On 17 July 1940, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was promoted
to the position of General der Flieger in recognition of his
service.
Operations over the Channel were successful. Although Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen's force severely over-claimed the
number of ships sunk, they did succeed in forcing the Royal
Navy to suspend convoys through the Channel temporarily, as
well as forcing it to abandon Dover as a base. On 8 August
1940, during one of the last operations against shipping,
his airmen claimed 48,500 tons of shipping sunk in one operation.
The actual number was just 3,581 tons.
Campaign against the RAF
In mid-August, the Luftwaffe was ready to begin the main assault
over Britain proper. The campaign opened on 13 August 1940,
christened Adlertag (Eagle Day), by
Hermann
Göring. The entire day met with repeated German failures,
in communication, intelligence, and coordination The objective
of the raids, Fighter Command's airfields, remained unscathed.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
Ju
87s were involved over the Portland area, and in actions
against RAF Warmwell and RAF Middle Wallop. Cloudy skies were
largely responsible for the failure of the raids. The campaign
did not get much better for Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
, on 15 August, known as the The Greatest Day. On 16 August,
elements of StG 2 had success against RAF Tangmere, in which
they destroyed 15 aircraft (seven Hawker Hurricanes and six
Bristol Blenheim night fighters. Damage was done to buildings
and workshops, but for a loss on nine
Ju
87s and three severely damaged. Three days later, the
Ju 87s suffered
their greatest defeat. On 18 August, a large group of air
battles led the day to be called The Hardest Day. On that
day, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'sent his units against
airfields in southern England. Faulty intelligence meant all
those hit by his units were unimportant. StG 77 struck at
Fleet Air Arm bases, which had little to do with Fighter Command.
In the process, the Geschwader took heavy losses.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was not so much shocked by
total
Ju 87
losses, which were running at a bearable 15 per cent, assuming
the raids were getting results and the battle short, but he
was alarmed at the near destruction of entire Gruppe, a loss
rate which ran at 50 per cent. It required a rethink of the
types use in the campaign. The Battle of Britain amounted
to a defeat for the
Ju
87. The
Ju
87s were removed from the battle, and were limited to
small-scale attacks on shipping until the spring, 1941, by
which time the Battle of Britain was over and the air war
over Britain (The Blitz) was winding down. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's force flew 100 sorties in October, compared
to the 100 per day in July 1940. In December 1940, VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps) ended its
Ju
87s operations and entered intensive winter training to
be ready for the resumption of operations in the spring.
Balkans Campaign
Battle of Yugoslavia
In April 1941 VIII. Fliegerkorps were tasked with supporting
the German invasion of Yugoslavia and the German Army in the
Battle of Greece and the Battle of Crete. The failure of the
Italian Army in the Greco-Italian War,
Adolf
Hitler was forced to intervene to secure the Axis flank,
close to the Romanian oilfields He approached Yugoslavia,
and asked them to join the Axis powers in order to facilitate
a quick victory in Greece. Initially the offer was accepted,
only later to be rejected after a pro-Allied government assumed
power. Operation Marita was expanded to involve the invasion
of both countries.
Preparations began in early 1941, as Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen moved his units into Bulgaria via Romania. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen found the country primitive, and resolved
to improve the infrastructure, particularly communications,
for the invasion of Yugoslavia. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
intended to operate 120 aircraft from Bulgarian airfields
and moved them into place on 1 March. While preparations were
taking place Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen indulged in hunting
and horse riding expeditions as a guest of the Bulgarian Royal
Family. With Boris III of Bulgaria, he discussed dive-bombing
techniques and the Corps' new aircraft, such as the
Junkers
Ju 88.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps was given two wings
of
Ju 87s
for the task Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) and Sturzkampfgeschwader
3 (StG 3), based in Bulgaria. With reinforcements, the German
air contingent, under Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4), would have
a total of 946 combat aircraft supported by hundreds of transport
machines. This force outnumbered the Greek, Yugoslav and RAF
forces combined. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen arranged
to have the German 12. Armee (12th Army) air reconnaissance
units co-operate with his own formations through the use of
a liaison.
The Corps' operations supported the German 12. Armee (12th
Army) in southern Yugoslavia, which cut the Yugoslav Army
off from Greece and the Allied forces there. The victory in
Yugoslavia was complete with the bombing of Belgrade, which
facilitated a rapid victory by destroying command and control
centres. Moreover, by adding Yugoslavia to its list of enemies,
the Axis' operations were eased. Instead of attacking strong
Greek fortifications on the Yugoslav-Greek border, the Germans
could break through the weak southern Yugoslav defences, and
then outflank the elite Greek forces defending the Metaxas
Line.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's force did not participate
in the bombing of Belgrade, but were engaged in attacking
Yugoslav reinforcements, concentrated on the Austrian and
Hungarian borders in the north, that were streaming south
to block the break through. Mass columns of Yugoslav forces
were caught in the open and decimated. The bombing of the
capital disabled the command and control function of the Yugoslav
Army, but it also convinced those in the government that further
resistance would meet with even more destruction. Yugoslavia
surrendered on 17 April.
Battle of Greece
Operations shifted to Greece. The Axis success in the Battle
of the Metaxas Line allowed them to outflank the main Greek
Army position and encircle the most effective Greek force.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's units supported the attack
against the Line, without much interference from Allied air
forces. Just 99 RAF aircraft (74 bombers) and 150 Greek aircraft
opposed Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's 500. By 15 April,
the RAF had withdrawn. From this date, VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps) main targets were Allied ships cramming the
evacuation ports. Unlike the gross over claiming against British
shipping in the English Channel in 1940, the claims of 280,000
tons of shipping (60 vessels) destroyed up until 30 April
1941 were approximately correct.
Allied forces withdrew down the east coast of Greece, where
the Royal Navy and Greek Navy began evacuating them from ports
around southern Greece, including the capital, Athens.
Ju
87 units from Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps
inflicted high losses on shipping, eliminating the small Greek
Navy and causing damage to British shipping. In two days,
the Greek Naval base at Piraeus lost 23 vessels to
Stuka
attack. From 21-24 April 43 ships were sunk on the southern
coast. Total Allied shipping losses amounted to 360,000 tons.
Battle of Crete
The end of the campaign on the mainland meant the sole remaining
objective was the island of Crete, which lay off Greece southern
coastline. During the Battle of Crete Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen's
Ju
87s also played a significant role. The operation came
close to disaster on the first day. Most of the airborne forces
that landed by Glider or parachute lost most of their radios,
which meant Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen reliant on aerial
reconnaissance aircraft. The German parachute troops were
pinned down on the island, on the Cretan airfields they were
supposed to capture. The level of effort Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen directed at relieving the pressure on them
quite possibly saved the German units from destruction.
On 21-22 May 1941, the Germans attempted to send in reinforcements
to Crete by sea, but lost 10 vessels to Force D under the
command of Rear-Admiral Irvine Glennie. The force consisting
of the cruisers HMS Dido, Orion and Ajax forced the remaining
German ships to retreat. The
Stuka
were called upon to deal with the British Naval threat. On
21 May, the destroyer HMS Juno was sunk, and the next day,
the battleship HMS Warspite was damaged and the cruiser HMS
Gloucester was sunk with the loss of 45 officers and 648 ratings.
The
Ju 87s
also crippled the cruiser HMS Fiji that morning, (she was
later finished off by
Bf
109 fighter bombers) while sinking the destroyer HMS Greyhound
with a single hit. As the Battle of Crete drew to a close
the Allies began yet another withdrawal. On 23 May the Royal
Navy also lost the destroyers HMS Kashmir and Kelly sunk followed
by HMS Hereward on 26 May Orion and Dido were also severely
damaged. Orion had been evacuating 1,100 soldiers to North
Africa and lost 260 of them killed and another 280 wounded
during the attacks. Around eight British destroyers and four
cruisers were sunk (not all by air attack), along with five
destroyers of the Greek Navy.
Eastern Front
Operation Barbarossa
On 22 June 1941 the Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa,
the invasion of the Soviet Union. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
continued his command of VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps)
which contained JG 27, StG 2, StG 3, 10./LG 2, and II.(S)./LG
2. Added to this force was II./Jagdgeschwader 52 (JG 52),
I./Kampfgeschwader 2 (KG 2), III./Kampfgeschwader 3 (KG 3)
and Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26). Initially his force
supported Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre), under the
command of
Albert
Kesselring Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2).
The Luftwaffe was numerically weaker than had been in May
1940, possessing 1,000 fewer aircraft. It had only 838 operational
bombers, as opposed to double that number the previous spring.
Whereas in France, it had to conduct operations 200 miles
deep, it had to do this on a front six times as long, many
times deeper, and with fewer aircraft. The failures of production
aside, the Luftwaffe had made improvements on its operational
organisation. The Flivos that Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
had championed in 1939 became a uniform facility throughout
the Luftwaffe. Each Panzer and Motorised division, now had
air liaison officers attached to them to allow for effective
air support. The experiments in France and the low countries
had paid off. By the summer, 1941, the Luftwaffe and its land-air
liaison teams would dramatically reduce the number of friendly-fire
incidents, as German assault aviation would have detailed
knowledge of friendly and enemy dispositions. It would not
be until the beginning of 1943, when the Western Allies began
adopting the same methods. In the opening phase of Barbarossa,
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's units were able to perform
very well. The response for air support did not usually exceed
two hours.
In the opening rounds, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was
involved in large pre-emptive strikes against the Red Air
Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily, or VVS) airfields. The Luftwaffe
lost 78 aircraft on 22 June, but destroyed 1,489 aircraft
on the ground, though further research indicates the number
exceeded 2,000 destroyed. It is likely that 1,800 aircraft
were destroyed in the first strike (for two losses), and 700
in the second (for 33 losses). The Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye
sily)' officer corps had been decimated in the Great Purge
and although it possessed a large aviation industry, and large
reserves, its modern aircraft were not up to the technical
standards of the Luftwaffe. Around 91 percent of units' commanders
had been in their post less than six months. Most of the Soviet
aircrews were poorly trained, and lacked radio communication
between pilots, much less air to ground liaisons or effective
ground support methods. The Soviet air forces in the Western
Soviet Union were largely destroyed. In July, waves of unescorted
Soviet bombers tried in vain to halt the German advance, only
to suffer extremely high loses. Within three days, the close
support units of
Albert
Kesselring Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2), including Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps, were able to revert to close
support and interdiction operations largely unhindered.
On 23 June, his Corps decimated the Soviet Western Front's
6th Cavalry Corps when they attempted a counter attack near
Grodno. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen threw all available
aircraft at the thrust and played a vital role in its defeat.
The Soviet Corps suffered 50 per cent casualties, mostly from
air attack. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps claimed
30 tanks, and 50 motor vehicles in 500 sorties. Heeresgruppe
Mitte (Army Group Centre) continued to advance, reaching Vitebsk.
VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) supported the army in the
Battle of Smolensk only days later. In this phase he was also
moved south, to support Panzergruppe
Guderian
(Panzer Group
Guderian),
which succeeded in supporting the capture of Orsha. The encirclement
of Soviet forces at Smolensk was complete on 17 July 1941.
Three weeks later, the last Soviet forces in the pocket were
eliminated. VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) achievements
were important in defeating Soviet counterattacks and attempted
breakouts. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was awarded the
Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross for an impressive performance.
Results from the battles, and in particular the defeat of
the Soviet counter attacks by the Soviet 13th and 24th Armies,
were impressive. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's forces
were credited with disrupting reinforcements and destroying
40 motor vehicles on 24 July alone.
However, logistically, the Germans were starting to suffer
serious problems in supplying their front line just four weeks
into the campaign. Wolfram Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
lamented, the Germans are good at fighting but weak at logistics.
While German production could make up for losses at the front,
it took time to get aircraft to the sector. The common operating
strength by late summer was 50 to 60 percent, including VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps). Between 19 July and 31 August,
the Luftwaffe had lost 725 aircraft. Before the operations
in the Soviet Union, scant attention had been made to logistical
operations in the east, primarily because of German overconfidence
The victories had been hard won, but growing Soviet resistance,
increased counterattacks brought the front on the Smolensk-Moscow
to a stalemate.
Adolf
Hitler wavered, and on 30 July ordered Heeresgruppe Mitte
(Army Group Centre) to assume the strategic defensive. In
Directive 34, he refocused the main effort of Barbarossa on
Leningrad because of strong concentrations of enemy forces
west of Moscow. To this end, Wolfram Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen and his Fliegerkorps was assigned to Luftflotte
1 (Air Fleet 1). During July 1941, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(OKW, or German High Command) displayed a lack of coherent
strategy. It shifted from pursuing one objective to the next.
It first wanted to advance to Moscow, then Leningrad, before
shifting operations further south.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen took almost all of his units,
except JG 52, to support Army Group North. In heavy combat,
working with I. Fliegerkorps (1st Air Corps), Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen 's fleet flew 1,126 sorties on 10 August, supporting
the German army's advance on Narva. They claimed 10 tanks,
more than 200 motor vehicles and 15 artillery batteries. Owing
to increased Soviet aviation activity, Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen directed ZG 26 against Soviet airfields, with success.
Further support was rendered to the German Sixteenth Army
at Novgorod near Lake Ilmen. Experienced crews from Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps, flying
He
111s from KG 4, attacked railways near Leningrad to disrupt
reinforcements. VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) airmen
noted Soviet resistance was far harder in the Lake Ilmen area
than they had previously experienced. On 15 August, a major
effort by StG 2 succeeded in softening up Soviet defences
and destroying the main Soviet supply bridge over the Volkhov
river. The fortress of Novgorod was destroyed by Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's
Ju
87s, and was thus abandoned. The city fell on 16 August.
Just 24 hours later, a major Soviet counter offensive by the
Soviet Northwestern Front attempted to recapture the city.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen , in conjunction with I. Fliegerkorps
(1st Air Corps) destroyed the attackers almost completely
near Staraya Russia KG 4 and KG 2 in particular were successful.
The later wing knocked out 18 Soviet tanks in a single mission,
despite the presence of strong Soviet fighter forces.
Bf
110s from Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's ZG 26 were
directed to deal with Soviet aviation on the ground. On 19
August, for the cost of just three
Bf
110s, they destroyed 40 Soviet aircraft on the ground
and three in the air, easing the pressure on German air units
which were meeting numerically superior numbers of the enemy.
The German Eighteenth Army and the Sixteenth Army successfully
conquered the remaining parts of Estonia, seizing Chudovo,
north of Novgorod, which severed one of the two main supply
lines from Leningrad to Moscow. In support of these operations,
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's Corps dropped 3,351 tons
of bombs in 4,742 attacks from 10 to 20 August 1941. On 20
August Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen moved strike and fighter
aircraft to Spasskaya Polist, 40 ki. northeast of Novgorod,
to support an attack that would encircle Leningrad, and cut
it off from Murmansk German XXXXI. Panzerkorps (41st Panzer
Corps) sealed in Soviet forces in the Lake Ilmen-Luga-Novgorod
sector. The Leningrad Front attempted to relieve them, and
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was ordered to blunt the attack.
The Soviets were supported by strong air units, and large
air battles broke out. During the course of them VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps) lost one of its most able
Stuka
aces, Anton Keil. The Germans succeeded in maintaining their
lines, and could now turn to capturing Leningrad.
Before a main assault could be launched, Leningrad needed
to be completely cut off from the Soviet hinterland which
led to the Siege of Leningrad. This was achieved by VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps), which supported the German Eighteenth
Army in forcing the Soviet 54th Army from the shores of Lake
Ladoga and Leningrad was isolated. Thereafter, VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps) and I. Fliegerkorps (1st Air Corps) concentrated
on a 16 square kilometres of front over Leningrad, achieving
numerical superiority. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's bombers
participated in great efforts to destroy Leningrad from the
air, some crews flying two missions per night. On 8 September,
6,327 incendiaries alone were dropped causing 183 fires. The
German Army advanced into the breaches created by the Luftwaffe.
However, by committing their last resources and reinforcing
their 54th Army (later renamed the 48th Army), the Soviets
stalled the German advance on 25 September. With the offensive
stopped,
Adolf
Hitler returned Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen to Luftflotte
2 (Air Fleet 2). Operations had been expensive. In August
VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) had lost 27 aircraft destroyed
and 143 damaged.
Frustrated in the north,
Adolf
Hitler turned to Moscow. On 2 October 1941 he enacted
Operation Typhoon, an offensive aimed at capturing Moscow
via a pincer movement. It much early success and succeeded
in enveloping considerable Soviet forces at Vyazma and Bryansk
by 10 October. However, the initial success gave way to a
grinding battle of attrition. By 11 November the situation
in the air was also changing from a position of initial parity.
Albert
Kesselring Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2) and the Headquarters
of I. Fliegerkorps (1st Air Corps) were moved to the Mediterranean
Theatre. This left Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) in control of all Axis aviation
supporting Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) against
Moscow. The Soviet opposition was growing in number and quality.
By 10 November, 1,138 aircraft (738 serviceable) including
658 fighters (497 serviceable) were defending Moscow. The
weather slowed down operations until the 15 November, when
the mud and rain water froze and mobile operations became
possible. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen threw all available
aircraft into the Battle for Moscow whenever conditions permitted.
VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) flew 1,300 sorties from
the 15 to 24 November.
One last attempt to capture Moscow was made on 2 December,
but lack of fuel and ammunition and increasingly stiff resistance
prevented its success. By this time, the Soviet air forces
had gained air superiority. By 5 December, when the counteroffensive
drove Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) back, they could
muster 1,376 aircraft against just 600 German. The Germans
possessed just 487 fighters (200 serviceable) on the entire
Eastern Front. There were 674 Soviet fighters (480 serviceable)
on the Moscow front. When the Soviet offensive began it quickly
gained ground. German morale sank and Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army
Group Centre), overstretched and exhausted, was threatened
with collapse. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's forces, despite
enemy air superiority, did all they could to blunt the attack.
The effectiveness and determination of German air units improved
the morale of the army. Concentrating aviation against Soviet
ground forces, the Luftwaffe delivered a series of attacks
that took the wind out of the Soviet offensive within two
weeks. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's forces bore the main
burden of the air defence against the Soviet attack, and had
been reinforced with four Kampfgruppen.
Adolf
Hitler had forbidden a retreat, and Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen endorsed this view. His refusal to give ground
and his tenacity saw him become one of
Adolf
Hitler's favourites.
Adolf
Hitler gave him a further five transport Gruppen to keep
his Corps effective. Fliegerkorp VIII would say on the front
until April 1942, fighting a series of Soviet counter offensives.
The Crimean campaign: Kerch
In the winter, 1941 to 1942, the stalemate on the north and
central sectors was not mirrored in the south. Heeresgruppe
Süd (Army Group South) had overrun the Ukraine, were
outside Rostov, considered the gate to the Caucasus and its
rich oil fields, and had occupied most of the Crimea. However,
in December the Soviets made an amphibious landing at the
Kerch Peninsula, on the extreme east coast of the Crimea.
The landing threatened to cut off the German Eleventh Army
commanded by
Erich
von Manstein, which were engaged in the siege of Sevastopol
on the southern-central tip of the Crimea.
Erich
von Manstein called off the siege and prepared, though
outnumbered and refused army reinforcements by
Adolf
Hitler who was building Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group
South) for a different operation (Case Blue), to repel the
danger. On 31 March, he laid down his plans and called his
offensive Operation Trappenjagd (Bustard Hunt).
On 17 April, he demanded massed close support aviation for
his offensive.
Erich
von Manstein turned to Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
and VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps), which had returned
to the front after resting and refitting in Germany.
Adolf
Hitler encouraged the reinforcement of German aviation
in the area, regarding
Erich
von Manstein's operation of great importance. The Soviets
not only had the chance to relieve Sevastopol, which would
allow the Black Sea Fleet to continue operating against Axis
shipping in the Black Sea, it would also provide air bases
for the Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily) to attack
the Romanian oil fields. Thus
Adolf
Hitler called for the greatest possible concentration
of air power to support the operation.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had arrived in Luneberg on
12 April, ready for a four-week period of leave. On 18 April
he received a call from the Luftwaffe's Chief of the General
Staff Hans Jeschonnek informed him he was to leave for Kerch
immediately. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen commented in
his diary, By order of the
Führer,
I must immediately leave again, to work at Kerch. Get there
quickly and get everything started! Formal orders still to
come. After meeting
Adolf
Hitler Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen wrote,
Adolf
Hitler insisted in a very respectful manner that I should
take part at Kerch, because I'm the only person who can do
the job.
Adolf
Hitler clearly had a high opinion of Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen and believed the Corps' record, as a specialised
close-support force, was unparalleled and would guarantee
success. He was right. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was
arrogant, aggressive and harsh, but he was a driven, proactive,
successful and influential tactical air commander.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen Corps had been resting in
Germany, rebuilding after the winter battles. This was still
in progress when Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen landed at
Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) headquarters at Nikolayev on 21
April. The discussion that Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
had with
Alexander
Löhr, the air fleet's commander, was unique in Luftwaffe
history. For the first time organisational custom, which was
to place Corps level units under the command of an air fleet
in whatever region the Corps was deployed, was abandoned.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was allowed to operate independently
alongside Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4). VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th
Air Corps) was under his command at all times and would provide
the lion's share of close support operations. All offensive
air operations were the responsibility of Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen , and he was only answerable to
Hermann
Göring. This news was not received well by
Alexander
Löhr or his chief of staff at Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet
4), Günther Korten. Günther Korten demanded that
he should be given command of the Corps. His request was ignored,
though he later fulfilled some of his ambitions by succeeding
Hans Jeschonnek as Chief of the General Staff after the latter's
suicide.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen met with
Erich
von Manstein on 28 April, and largely got on with
Erich
von Manstein. Despite being conceited personalities, they
both genuinely respected each other. Though on one occasion
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen claimed in his diary to have
taken great delight in beating
Erich
von Manstein in a debate over tactical differences.
Erich
von Manstein and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen determined
that the limited land forces available meant communication
between land and air forces were critical. The main points
of effort were discussed and each man's staff was ordered
to deal directly with each other to facilitate rapid cooperation
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was incredibly proactive Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen flew in his
Storch
around the front, often coming under enemy fire and on occasion
force-landing. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen urged his Corps
to speed up preparations and openly criticised his superiors,
including
Alexander
Löhr of Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4), over what he
considered to be inferior preparations. The difficulty in
getting units out of Germany quickly, where they were refitting,
prompted Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen , in consultation
with Hans Jeschonnek and
Erich
von Manstein, to ask for a postponement of the offensive
for two days until they could be brought in. His request was
granted, and the offensive was moved to the 7 May 1942. When
the reinforcements arrived, he had 11 bomber, three dive-bomber
and seven fighter Gruppen at his disposal.
The ensuing operation led to the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's forces quickly established
air superiority, destroying 82 enemy fighters within the first
day. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen arrived at his command
post as the bombs first fell. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was impressed with the 2,100 sorties flown on 7 May. Inter
service communication was facilitated by Fliegerverbindungsoffizier
(air liaison officers or Flivos), specially trained air force
officers attached to ground units. They advised the air Corps
on the situation and intentions of the ground forces and also
advised the army of the best use of air power. This operational
style was effective against fixed targets in slow-moving operations,
but was more difficult in fast-moving operations such as Bustard
Hunt. The advance meant Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had
to keep moving forward. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen complained
bitterly about the inability of his signals teams to set up
new telephone and radio communications quickly enough.
Operations were successful. The Corps flew 1,700 missions
on the 9 May, destroying 42 enemy aircraft for two losses.
On 10 and 11 May, bad weather prevented large-scale operations,
but on the 12 May they flew 1,500 sorties. On this day, the
Soviet line in the Crimea collapsed. Enjoying air supremacy,
they Wehrmacht made large gains. Near the Sea of Azov, Soviet
infantry, massed and unprotected, suffered heavy losses to
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's units which were using Cluster
bombs. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was delighted at the
wonderful scene we are inflicting the highest losses of blood
and material. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was amazed at
the scale of destruction Terrible! Corpse-strewn fields from
earlier attacks. I have seen nothing like it so far in this
war. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was so shocked, he felt
compelled to show the Luftwaffe's signals officer, Wolfgang
Martini, the carnage.
However, that same evening, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
received bad news. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was ordered
to send one fighter, one dive-bomber and two bomber Gruppen
to help contain a Soviet breakthrough in the north, and the
developing Second Battle of Kharkov. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen complained in his diary, claiming success was now
in question at Kerch. The statement was likely hyperbole.
By this time the Soviets had collapsed in the Crimea, and
were streaming back to the port of Kerch. Kerch fell on 15
May. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen then complained he did
not have the adequate forces to stop the Soviets evacuating
by sea, but Axis aviation did inflict considerable attrition
on Soviet units on the beaches and sank a number of vessels.
German artillery and air attack brought the Dunkirk-style
evacuation to an end on 17 May.
Erich
von Manstein praised Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
support, describing his air operations as decisive in the
Kerch victory. The Corps had flown between 1,000 to 2,000
missions per day before the Kharkov withdrawal, and 300 to
800 afterwards. It effectively decimated Soviet air power
in the region, reducing it to barely 60 aircraft from over
300 in 10 days. Other sources give a total of 3,800 sorties
flown in support of Trappenjagd.
The Crimean campaign: Sevastopol
On 20 May, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen met
Erich
von Manstein again to discuss preparations for overcoming
the fortress port of Sevastopol. It was emphasised that the
same level of air support offered at Kerch was needed. On
22 May, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had the chance to
meet with
Adolf
Hitler, who once again flattered the Luftwaffe commander
and his abilities, referring to him as his specialist. The
aim of the discussion as far as Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
was concerned, was to impress upon
Adolf
Hitler the importance of not diverting forces away from
the front as had been done at Kerch.
Adolf
Hitler listened closely and agreed.
Adolf Hitler
and the Luftwaffe Chief of the General Staff Hans Jeschonnek
intended to promote Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen to command
Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4), while sending
Alexander
Löhr to the Balkans.
Hermann
Göring wanted Bruno Loerzer, his friend and commander
of II. Fliegerkorps (2nd Air Corps) to take the job, but
Adolf
Hitler wanted a hands on commander. Hans Jeschonnek agreed
that the higher command of the air force was lousy, and needed
a competent combat leader. On 25 May he flew the six hour
flight back to Simferopol.
During the planning phase he ordered anti-shipping operations
to cease in the Black Sea and ordered Admiral Schwarzes Meer
(Admiral Black Sea) to stay in port. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen feared that the coming operations would mean friendly
fire incidents against Axis shipping near Sevastopol. Admiral
Friedrich
Götting and Fliegerführer Süd (Flying Leader
South) Wolfgang von Wild, responsible for all naval aviation
in the region, ignored the request as they saw it as absurd.
It was only necessary to abandon operations in the Crimean
shipping lanes, not the whole expanse of the Black Sea.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen pooled his resources with
Wolfgang von Wild and Kurt Pflugbeil's IV. Fliegerkorps (4th
Air Corps). This gave the Luftwaffe some 600 aircraft to support
Erich
von Manstein. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'scrapped
all the forces he could for the assault, getting three dive-bombers,
six medium bomber and three fighter Gruppen for the operation.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was not overly concerned with
his fighter strength, as his fighters outnumbered the 60-odd
aircraft of the Soviet air defence. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
could begin close support operations immediately and did not
have to wait to conduct time-wasting battles for air superiority.
So confident was Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen that the
Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily) posed no threat,
he lent his Flak forces to the army, though he retained operational
control.
The stages of the air campaign were managed into three attacking
Soviet reserves beyond German artillery raids against harbour
facilities, airfields, fortresses and shipping cooperating
with German artillery to cancel out Soviet mortar and gun
batteries. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen acknowledged that
not all of these components could be conducted simultaneously.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen chose shattering the fortifications
through relentless air bombardment as the most important tactic.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen garnered most of the air units
into supporting the land operations. His view of anti-shipping
operations, and Wolfgang von Wild's conduct of them, was scathing.
However, he did not take into account the systemic technical
problems with German U-boat and aerial torpedoes which were
unreliable, and blamed Wolfgang von Wild and the air units
instead for failing to achieve much success.
When the operation, Sturgeon Catch, began on 2 June 1942,
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen watched it all unfold. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen awoke at 330 hours and by 545 hours
was watching the first waves of bombers hit Sevastopol from
his own
Storch,
in company with his chief of staff. The air units of VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) were positioned close to the
front, some 70 kilometres away. The aircraft barely had time
to reach altitude before reaching the target, but the close
proximity of the front allowed for short flights and low fuel
consumption which eased logistics. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
's forces flew 723 sorties and dropped 525 tons of bombs.
The bombs included the fortress busting 1,400 kg, 1,700 kg
and 1,800 kg bombs. Between the 3 and 6 June, 2,355 missions
showered 1,800 tons of bombs and 23,000 incendiaries. On 7
June 1,300 tons of bombers were dropped in 1,368 air attacks
and were followed on 8 June by another 1,200 sorties. The
mechanics were working around the clock to keep the aircraft
operational in sweltering heat up to 105 degrees F. On 9 June
1,044 sorties and 954 tons of bombs were dropped, followed
by 688 sorties and 634 tons the next day. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's logistics were stretched after a weak of
action. On 11 June another effort dropped 1,000 tons of bombs
in 1,070 sorties. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen noted that
he now had only enough supplies for 36 hours of operations.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen ordered only important and
fewer targets attacked, ordering aircraft to attack in columns
to reduce the wastage of bombs and keep the pressure up on
the fortifications. It failed to solve the bomb calamity,
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen noted on 14 June and three
days later he could only drop 800 of the planned 1,000 tons.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen participation on the operation
came to an abrupt end on 23 June 1942. Having been informed
by Hans Jeschonnek and
Adolf
Hitler that he was to assume command of Luftflotte 4 (Air
Fleet 4) after the fall of Sevastopol earlier, they decided
not to wait. They ordered him to Kursk in order to take up
his command, leaving his Corps behind, and Sevastopol air
operations under the command of Wolfgang von Wild. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was disgusted. Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen felt it was ridiculous to move him mid-operation,
and he had wanted to be there when the fortress fell. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen wrote, It is a pity that one can never
finish what one starts in the east. After a while, it takes
away all the pleasure.
Without Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen , VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps) continued to contribute to the successful
but costly operation. The Corps flew 23,751 sorties and dropped
20,000 tons of bombs, losing just 31 aircraft. The Axis finally
achieved victory on 4 July 1942, when the last defenders were
routed. The Luftwaffe's close support arm reached a peak over
Sevastopol. From then on, it would be dispersed over the Eastern
Front.
Case Blue
On 28 June 1942 the Axis began their major summer offensive,
Case Blue. Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South) objective
was to advance towards the Stalingrad and Caucasus regions.
Now commanding Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4), Generaloberst Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was one of the largest commands supporting
the effort. The Luftwaffe concentrated its largest single
force since Barbarossa. Of the 2,690 aircraft supporting Case
Blue, 52 per cent (1,400) were under the command of Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen . A further 265 Romanian, Hungarian,
Italian and Slovak aircraft were also present. Opposing them
were 2,800 aircraft (900 in reserve) including 1,200 fighters
of the southern Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily) front.
To the north, the Soviets had been convinced the main attack
was to come against Moscow owing to the German deception plan
Operation Kremlin.
The offensive opened on the 28 June, and the Red Army put
the German forces on the boundary of Army Groups Centre and
South under severe pressure in the belief the main thrust
to Moscow would emanate from that region. The battles of Voronezh
cost the Soviets 783 aircraft by the 24 July, but it meant
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen had to divert VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps), now under the command of Martin Fiebig, north
to deal with the threats while Kurt Pflugbeil's IV. Fliegerkorps
(4th Air Corps) covered the advance into the Caucasus. On
18 July Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen moved Luftflotte 4
(Air Fleet 4) and its head quarters to Mariupol on the Sea
of Azov. On 2 August Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen created
the Gefechtsverband Nord under the command of Alfred Bulowius
Nahaufklarung, Jadg, Kampf and
Stuka
Gruppen (Groups) and combined these groups on an ad-hoc basis
to support the hard-pressed Heer. Hungarian and Italian air
units also assisted. Within six weeks, Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen had lost 350 aircraft and objected to
Adolf
Hitler's directive splitting the two armies Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A) and Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) to pursue
the capture of Stalingrad and the Baku oilfields at the same
time, as he now had to support two lines of logistics which
he could ill-afford. Nevertheless he committed himself to
his task, and ordered Martin Fiebig to destroy rail links
around Stalingrad, where the 6. Armee (6th Army), despite
having 1,000 aircraft supporting its drive to the city, were
struggling to make rapid headway.
On 3 September, the Luftwaffe began it major effort against
the city by beginning several destructive raids. The Battle
of Stalingrad initiated a regression in air tactics back to
the First World War, where a few flights of aircraft made
pin point attacks against enemy infantry and acted as an extension
of the infantry. The
Ju
87 units usually flew four sorties per day. Their bombing
was so accurate that Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen commented
in his diary that they dropped bombs within hand-grenade distances.
In October, the Romanian Air Corps arrived 180 aircraft which
attacked rail targets north east of Stalingrad and eased the
air situation. Logistics were stretched and the front in Stalingrad
formed into a stalemate, with the Germans having taken central
and southern Stalingrad. With no reinforcements, and having
lost 14 percent of his strength, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
turned to support the German Army in the Caucasus.
Hermann
Göring ordered him to concentrate on Stalingrad,
but Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen refused to return. This
prompted a meeting between
Adolf
Hitler, Hans Jeschonnek and
Hermann
Göring on 15 October.
Adolf
Hitler was in a good mood, and he had taken personal command
of Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) operations in the Caucasus
on 9 September. He supported Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
and gave him the authority to continue, partly in the belief
that the battle in Stalingrad was nearly over.
This had not always been the case. Most of German aviation
had been concentrated on the Stalingrad Front in August, on
Adolf Hitler's
orders. Kurt Pflugbeil's IV. Fliegerkorps (4th Air Corps)
was over-stretched for over a month from 28 July. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen had wanted to support Heeresgruppe
B (Army Group B) in the south, but despite the Caucasus oilfields
being the primary target for German strategy, the Army Group
received poor air support. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
arm chair general tactics were important in deciding where
air power was to be used, and would be done so only if he
rated the army's chances of success as reasonable. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen allowed some raids against Grozny's
oilfields and close support operations, but the mountain terrain
in the region made it difficult for the Panzer Divisions to
exploit the actions of his air units. In a fit of pique at
the army's failures, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen refused
to provide support for the Caucasus front. This remained the
situation until mid-October. For a few days, a concentrated
effort was made in the Caucasus.
Adolf
Hitler's realisation that the oilfields at Baku could
not be captured meant that he was forced to order the Luftwaffe
to eliminate them. The operations had limited success.
In the winter, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was forced
to reshuffle his units around to meet threats and offer support.
By 7 November, he had helped the German 6. Armee (6th Army)
eliminate nearly all of the Soviet forces in Stalingrad. But
the effort created a supply crisis. The Luftwaffe's railheads
100 kilometres west of Stalingrad, and regardless of the army's
difficulties, his units got logistical priority. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen recommended this be amended. The battle in
Stalingrad had meant, in Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
view, that air units could not be effective in close-quarter
combat. Until this point, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
had received 42,630 tons of supplies and 20,713 tons of fuel
while the army received 9,492 tons of fuel. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen rationed his own fuel stocks which allowed
him to create a reserve but also increased, by air lift, the
tonnage from 2,000 to 5,000 tons
Disaster at Stalingrad
On 19 November the Red Army began a counter offensive, named
Operation Uranus. Within days, the Soviets had encircled some
300,000 German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers in
the city of Stalingrad. It was decided by
Adolf
Hitler and the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command
of the Air Force) to supply the Axis forces by air. Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was horrified. He telephoned Berchtesgaden
and tried to get through to
Adolf
Hitler, but none of his aides would put him through. He
tried to convince
Hermann
Göring that his air fleet did not have the resources
to sustain an air lift, and that the best option would be
to attempt a breakout before the Soviet forces entrenched.
He flew to
Erich
von Manstein's head quarters, and the Field Marshal agreed
a breakout must take place. With the 6. Armee (6th Army) preserved,
the initiative could be regained later. He made this request
to
Adolf Hitler.
The Soviet divisions were smaller than their German counter
parts, but they had 97 of them. Holding Stalingrad was now
impossible.
In the event,
Adolf
Hitler chose to continue with the airlift, perhaps influenced
by the Luftwaffe's success in the Demyansk Pocket. Luftflotte
4 (Air Fleet 4) failed to alter the situation. The best air
lift operation took place on 7 December 1942, when 363.6 tons
was flown in. However, the concentration of Soviet aviation
disrupted the intended supply operations and German transport
losses were heavy. Some 266
Junkers
Ju 52s were destroyed, three quarters of the fleet's strength
on the Eastern Front. The
He
111 Gruppen lost 165 aircraft in transport operations.
Other losses included 42
Junkers
Ju 86s, nine
Fw
200 Condors, five
Heinkel
He 177 bombers and a
Junkers
Ju 290. The Luftwaffe also lost close to 1,000 highly
experienced bomber crew personnel. So heavy were the Luftwaffe's
losses that four of Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) transport units
(KGrzbV 700, KGrzbV 900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1) were
formally dissolved. In the air, the Luftwaffe had sustained
its heaviest defeat since the Battle of Britain. The remnants
of the German 6. Armee (6th Army) surrendered on 2 February
1943.
A complete disaster was averted by Heeresgruppe Süd (Army
Group South), largely thanks to Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
's Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) and his former VIII. Fliegerkorps
(8th Air Corps), under his overall command. The loss of Stalingrad
left Rostov on Don the only bottleneck supplying Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A) in the Caucasus. In December 1942, Luftflotte
4 (Air Fleet 4) was still one of the most powerful single
air commands in the world. On 15 January 1943, 1,140 of the
1,715 aircraft on the Eastern Front were under Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen's command. Its attacks on the Soviet South
Western Front prevented the Soviets from achieving the goal
of isolating the Army Group in the Caucasus. Its air operations
proved decisive in this regard.
Although defeated, Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) had flown 24,760
wounded and 5,150 technical personnel out of Stalingrad, which
was 11 per cent of the total German manpower. It delivered
only 19 per cent of the required supplies. It had four fewer
transport groups than at Demyansk, so failed in its overall
task despite Martin Fiebig ordering his bombers onto transport
operations. They managed an average of 68 sorties per day,
delivering 111 tons of supplies against the requirement of
300 tons for the 6. Armee (6th Army).
After the defeat, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen travelled
to see
Adolf
Hitler on 11 February. He first met with
Hermann
Göring, who was worried that Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen would use the opportunity to criticise his leadership.
In the event he did not, but Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
did criticise
Hermann
Göring reluctance to disagree with
Adolf
Hitler and attacked his willingness to allow him to receive
what he considered to be faulty advice. When Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen did meet
Adolf
Hitler he criticised him openly for micromanagement, though
he did insist he had been let down by his advisors.
Adolf
Hitler took all of this calmly, and admitted (as he had
done to Erhard Milch) that he bore the ultimate responsibility
for the air lift fiasco. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen argued
commanders needed more tactical and operational freedom, as
had
Erich
von Manstein.
Adolf
Hitler agreed. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was probably
helped, regardless of his criticism, by the fact that
Adolf
Hitler genuinely liked him, and believed him to be loyal.
Four days later Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was promoted
to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall.
Recovery at Third Kharkov
The front line threatened to collapse altogether in the east,
but the Red Army had not yet learned the full lessons of manoeuvre
warfare. At Stalin's behest, it attempted to cut off the Axis
forces in the Caucasus by advancing to Rostov, using Kharkov
and Belgorod as a springboard. It strained the logistics of
Soviet forces and presented an ideal chance for
Erich
von Manstein to counterattack. Radio intercepts suggested
the Soviets were low on fuel, for their ground forces and
the Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily), giving more
urgency for a counter stroke. It would lead to the Third Battle
of Kharkov, where
Erich
von Manstein would win a major victory.
To support his attack Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen'sent
eight of his weakest Gruppen home to rest and refit, which
allowed the machines left to be redistributed among stronger
units. With congestion eased the infrastructure could cope
with serviceability, which improved dramatically. The Luftwaffe
was also now back near to pre-prepared air bases, near logistical
railheads at Nikolaiev and Poltava which enabled accelerated
rates of re-equipment. After allowing his forces to re-equip
near Rostov, he moved his units on 18 February. Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen moved his forces closer to the front Fliegerkorps
I, now under Günther Korten was moved from Boryspil,
near Kiev to Poltava, IV. Fliegerkorps (4th Air Corps) under
Martin Fiebig was moved to the Kuban and V. Fliegerkorps (5th
Air Corps) under Kurt Pflugbeil was moved to Dnepropetrovsk
in the centre of the German offensive thrust. These forces
were to support the 1. Panzerarmee (1st Panzer Army) and the
4. Panzerarmee (4th Panzer Army). Günther Korten began
his support for the 4. Panzerarmee (4th Panzer Army) on 19
February 1943. By the 21 February 1,145 sorties had been flown,
and another 1,486 were flown the following day. With the offensive
going well, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen took the time
to rest. The Luftwaffe flew a daily average of 1,000 sorties,
with total air superiority owing to the absence of the Red
Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily). In the event
Erich
von Manstein encircled and destroyed a large number of
enemy forces, stabilising the front, but leaving a bulge in
the east, around the city of Kursk.
Throughout the spring and early summer, 1943, Wolfram Freiherr
von Richthofen began preparing his air fleet for Operation
Citadel, and the Battle of Kursk, the major summer campaign
which was supposed to repeat the Kharkov victory on a larger
scale, and turn the tide in the east back in the Axis favour.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen did not take part. Third Kharkov
proved to be his last battle in the Soviet Union, and he was
transferred to the Mediterranean to begin operations there.
Death
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was suffering from headaches
and exhaustion and was diagnosed as having a brain tumour
He was sent on medical leave to the Luftwaffe hospital for
neurological injuries at Bad Ischl. On 27 October 1944, Wolfram
Freiherr von Richthofen was operated on by chief brain surgeon
Professor Dr. Wilhelm Tönnis. Professor Dr. Wilhelm Tönnis,
a former professor at the University of Würzburg, was
one of the most noted German specialists. Initially it was
thought that the operation was successful, but the tumour
had only been slowed. In November 1944 Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen was officially relieved of his command in Italy
and transferred to the Führerreserve. His condition declined
steadily in early 1945. It is thought likely that Professor
Dr. Wilhelm Tönnis attempted a second operation but the
tumour had progressed beyond hope for recovery. Germany surrendered
on 8 May 1945. The hospital was taken over by the American
Third Army and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen became a prisoner
of war. Wolfram Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen passed away
on 12 July 1945.
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