Branch: Heer
Born: 15 November 1891 in Heidenheim, Kingdom of Württemberg,
German Empire.
Died: 14 October 1944 in Herrlingen, Germany.
Ranks:
Generalfeldmarschall 21 June
1942
Generaloberst 24 January 1942
General der Panzertruppe 1
July 1941
Generalleutnant 9 February
1941
Generalmajor 1 August 1939
Oberst 1 October 1937
Oberstleutnant 1 October 1933
Major 1 April 1932
Hauptmann 18 October 1918
Oberleutnant 18 September
1915
Leutnant 27 January 1912
Fähnrich 19 July 1910
Decorations:
Württembergische Goldene Verdienstmedaille 25 February
1915
Military Merit Order Fourth Class with Swords
Military Merit Order Second Class
Württembergischer Friedrich Order with Swords First Class
Military Merit Order 8 April 1915
Military Merit Cross III. Klasse
Iron Cross 1914
2nd Class 30 September 1914
1st Class 22 March 1915
Pour le Mérite on 10 December 1917
Wound Badge 1918 in Silver in 1918
Cross of Honor in 1934
Sudetenland Medal
Memel Medal
Wehrmacht Long Service Award
Ornate Samurai Sword from the Emperor of Japan
Iron Cross 1939
2nd Class 17 May 1940
1st Class 21 May 1940
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords,
and Diamonds
Knight's Cross 27 May 1940
Oak Leaves 20 March 1941
Swords 20 January 1942
Diamonds 11 March 1943
Wound Badge in Gold 7 August 1944
Panzer Badge in Silver
Italian Medaglia d'Argento al Valor Militare 22 April 1941
Knight of the Colonial Order of the Star of Italy 28 April
1942
Grand Officer of the Italian Military Order of Savoy 1942
Romanian Order of Michael the Brave 3rd and 2nd Class 12 July
1944
Commands:
Other: Personnel
Articles:
Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 and
was known as the Desert Fox (Wüstenfuchs), was a German
Field Marshal of World War II. He won the respect of both
his own troops and the enemies he fought. He was a highly
decorated officer in World War I, and was awarded the Pour
le Mérite for his exploits on the Italian front. In
World War II, he further distinguished himself as the commander
of the 7th Panzer Division during the 1940 invasion of France.
However, it was his leadership of German and Italian forces
in the North African campaign that established the legend
of the Desert Fox. He is considered to have been one of the
most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the conflict.
He later commanded the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel
invasion in Normandy.
As one of the few generals who consistently fought the Western
Allies (he was never assigned to the Eastern Front), Erwin
Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional
officer. His Afrikakorps was never accused of war crimes.
Soldiers captured during his Africa campaign were reported
to have been treated humanely. Furthermore, he ignored orders
to kill captured commandos, Jewish soldiers and civilians
in all theatres of his command.
Late in the war, Erwin Rommel was linked to the conspiracy
to kill
Adolf
Hitler. Because Erwin Rommel was widely renowned,
Adolf
Hitler chose to eliminate him quietly in trade for assurances
his family would be spared, Erwin Rommel agreed to commit
suicide.
Early life and career
Erwin Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 in Heidenheim, 45
kilometres from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg (then
part of the German Empire). He was baptised on 17 November
1891. He was the second child of the Protestant headmaster
of the secondary school at Aalen, Professor Erwin Rommel Senior
1860 to 1913, and Helene von Luz, who had two other sons and
a daughter. Erwin Rommel wrote that my early years passed
quite happily.
At age 14, Erwin Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider
that was able to fly short distances. Erwin Rommel even considered
becoming an engineer and throughout his life displayed extraordinary
technical aptitude. Acceding to his father's wishes, Erwin
Rommel instead joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry
Regiment as an officer cadet in 1910 and was sent to the Officer
Cadet School in Danzig. He graduated on 15 November 1911 and
was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912.
While at Cadet School, Erwin Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old
Lucia Maria Mollin (commonly called Lucie). They married on
27 November 1916 in Danzig and on 24 December 1928 had a son,
Manfred Rommel, who later became the Mayor of Stuttgart. Some
historians believe Erwin Rommel also had a relationship with
Walburga Stemmer in 1913, which allegedly produced a daughter,
Gertrud.
World War I
During World War I, Erwin Rommel fought in France as well
as in Romania and Italy, first in the 6th Württemberg
Infantry Regiment, but through most of the war in the Württemberg
Mountain Battalion of the elite Alpenkorps. He gained a reputation
for great courage, making quick tactical decisions and taking
advantage of enemy confusion. He was wounded three times and
awarded the Iron Cross, First and Second Class. Erwin Rommel
also received Prussia's highest award, the order of Pour le
Mérite, after fighting in the Battles of the Isonzo
in the north-eastern Alps on the Isonzo river front. The award
was for the Battle of Longarone and the capture of Mount Matajur
and its Italian defenders, which totalled 150 officers, 9,000
men, and 81 artillery pieces. In contrast, Erwin Rommel's
detachment suffered only 6 dead and 30 wounded during the
two engagements, a remarkable achievement.
For a time, Erwin Rommel served in the same infantry regiment
as
Friedrich
Paulus, who like Erwin Rommel rose to the rank of Field
Marshal during World War II. While fighting at Isonzo, Erwin
Rommel was caught behind Italian lines but managed to escape
capture, though almost all of his staff were taken prisoner.
In the Second World War, when the Germans and Italians were
allies, Erwin Rommel tempered his initial disdain of Italian
soldiers, when he realised that their lack of success was
principally due to poor leadership and equipment. When these
difficulties were overcome they were equal to German forces.
Erwin Rommel wrote a book, Infanterie Greift An (Infantry
Attacks), in which he examined and analysed the many battles
he fought in during World War I. It was published in 1937
and became essential reading for both German and allied commanders
during World War II. He taught his men to dig in whenever
they paused for any length of time. This paid off many times
when French artillery fired upon his position, only to be
shrugged off by the entrenchments built by Erwin Rommel's
men.
Career between the world wars
Erwin Rommel turned down a post in the Truppenamt (the camouflaged
General Staff), whose existence was forbidden by the Treaty
of Versailles the normal path for advancing to high rank in
the German army. Instead, he preferred to remain a front line
officer.
Erwin Rommel held battalion commands and was an instructor
at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933. In 1934,
his book for infantry training, Gefechts-Aufgaben für
Zug und Kompanie : Ein Handbuch für den Offizierunterricht
to (Combat tasks for platoon and company: A manual for the
officer instruction), appeared. This book was printed until
1945 in five editions, with revisions and changes of title.
From 1935 to 1938, Erwin Rommel held commands at the Potsdam
War Academy. Erwin Rommel's war diaries, Infanterie greift
an (Infantry Attacks), published in 1937, became a highly
regarded military textbook and attracted the attention of
Adolf Hitler,
who placed Erwin Rommel in charge of the War Ministry liaison
with the
Adolf
Hitler Youth (
Adolf
Hitler Jugend), Headquarters of Military Sports, the branch
involved with paramilitary activities, primarily terrain exercises
and marksmanship. Erwin Rommel applied himself energetically
to the task. The army provided instructors to the
Adolf
Hitler Youth Rifle School in Thuringia, which in turn
supplied qualified instructors to the HJ's regional branches.
In 1937, Erwin Rommel conducted a tour of
Adolf
Hitler Youth meetings and encampments and delivered lectures
on German soldiering while inspecting facilities and exercises.
Simultaneously, he was pressuring Baldur von Schirach, the
Adolf Hitler
Youth leader, to accept an agreement expanding the army's
involvement in
Adolf
Hitler Youth training. Schirach interpreted this as a
bid to turn the
Adolf
Hitler Youth into an army auxiliary, a junior army
in his words. He refused and denied Erwin Rommel (whom he
had come to dislike personally, apparently out of envy for
his real soldier's appeal) access to the
Adolf
Hitler Youth. An agreement was concluded, but on a far
more limited scope than Erwin Rommel sought co-operation
was restricted to the army's providing personnel to the rifle
school. By 1939 the
Adolf
Hitler Youth had 20,000 rifle instructors. Simultaneously,
Erwin Rommel retained his place at Potsdam. Erwin Rommel was
awarded the highest war ribbons for excellent performance.
In 1938 Erwin Rommel, now a colonel, was appointed Kommandant
(commander) of the War Academy at Wiener Neustadt (Theresian
Military Academy). Erwin Rommel was removed after a short
time, however, to take command of
Adolf
Hitler's personal protection battalion (FührerBegleitbataillon),
assigned to protect him in the special railway train (Führersonderzug)
used during his visits to occupied Czechoslovakia and Memel.
It was during this period that he met and befriended
Joseph
Goebbels, the Reich's minister of propaganda.
Joseph
Goebbels became a fervent admirer of Erwin Rommel and
later ensured that Erwin Rommel's exploits were celebrated
in the media.
World War II
Poland 1939
Erwin Rommel acted as commander of the Führerbegleithauptquartier
(Führer escort headquarters) during the Poland campaign,
often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug
and seeing much of
Adolf
Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Erwin Rommel returned
to Berlin to organise the Führer's victory parade, taking
part himself as a member of
Adolf
Hitler's entourage. During the Polish campaign, Erwin
Rommel was asked to intervene on behalf of one of his wife's
relatives, a Polish priest who had been arrested. When Erwin
Rommel applied to the Gestapo for information, the Gestapo
found no information about the man's existence.
France 1940
Erwin Rommel asked
Adolf
Hitler for command of a panzer division. On 6 February
1940, three months before the invasion of France, Erwin Rommel
was given command of the 7th Panzer Division, for Fall Gelb
(Case Yellow), the invasion of France and the
Low Countries. This promotion provoked resentment among some
of his fellow officers. Erwin Rommel's initial request for
command had been rejected by the Chief of Army Personnel,
who cited his lack of previous experience with armoured units
and his extensive prior experience in an Alpine unit made
him a more suitable candidate to assume command of a mountain
division that had recent need to fill its commanding officer
post. Erwin Rommel had, however, emphasised the use of mobile
infantry and reorganised the great usefulness of armoured
forces in the Poland campaign. He set about learning and developing
the techniques of armoured warfare with great enthusiasm.
The decision to place him in command of an armoured division
was borne out to be an excellent one. In May, 1940 his 7th
Panzer Division became known as the Ghost Division
because its rapid advances and fast paced attacks often placed
them so far forward that they were frequently out of communication
with the rest of the German army.
Invasion of France and Belgium
On 10 May 1940 a part of XV Corps under General
Hermann
Hoth advanced into Belgium to proceed to the Meuse river
near the Walloon municipality of Dinant. At the Meuse, 7th
Panzer was held up owing to the bridges having been destroyed
and to determined sniper and artillery fire from the Belgian
defenders. The Germans lacked smoke grenades, so Erwin Rommel,
having assumed personal command of the crossing, ordered a
few nearby houses to be set on fire to conceal the attack.
The German Panzergrenadiers crossed the river in rubber boats,
with Erwin Rommel leading the second wave. The Division dashed
further inland, always spurred on by Erwin Rommel and far
in front of any friendly forces.
Erwin Rommel's technique of pushing forward boldly, ignoring
risks to his flanks and rear and relying on the shock to enemy
morale to hinder attacks on his vulnerable flanks, paid large
dividends during his rapid march across France. When encountering
resistance, Erwin Rommel would simply order his tanks forward,
all guns blazing, relying on the shock of the sudden assault
to force the enemy to surrender. This method offset the disadvantage
the German tanks had in terms of armour and low-calibre guns,
often causing large formations of enemy heavy tanks to simply
give up a fight they would otherwise have had a good chance
of winning. This approach, although it saved lives on both
sides by avoiding prolonged engagements, did cause mishaps.
On one occasion his tanks, following this tactic, closed with
a convoy of French trucks and fired into them only to realise
that the trucks were acting as ambulances ferrying wounded
from the front.
Battle of Arras
By 18 May the Division had captured Cambrai, but here Erwin
Rommel's advance was checked briefly. His chief of staff,
still with the unmotorised part of the Division in Belgium
and not having received radio reports from Erwin Rommel, had
written off Erwin Rommel and his combat group as lost and
so had not arranged for fuel to be sent up. There was a degree
of controversy over this issue, with Erwin Rommel furious
at what he perceived as a negligent attitude on the part of
his supply officers, whereas his chief of staff was critical
of Erwin Rommel's failure to keep his staff officers informed
of his actions.
On 20 May Erwin Rommel's tanks reached Arras. Here he wanted
to cut off the British Expeditionary Force from the coast
and Hans von Luck, commanding the reconnaissance battalion
of the Division, was tasked with forcing a crossing over the
La Bassée canals near the city. Supported by Stuka
dive bombers, the unit managed to cross whereupon the British
launched a counterattack (the Battle of Arras) on 21 May.
Facing the British Matilda tanks, the Germans found their
3.7-cm guns useless against the heavy armour and a battery
of 88 mm guns had to be brought up to deal with the threat,
with Erwin Rommel personally directing the fire.
After Arras,
Adolf
Hitler ordered his tanks to hold their positions, while
the British, in Operation Dynamo, evacuated their troops at
Dunkirk, and the 7th Panzer Division was given a few days
of much-needed rest. On 26 May, 7th Panzer continued its advance,
reaching Lille on 27 May. For the assault on the town, General
Hermann
Hoth placed his other tank division, 5th Panzer Division,
under Erwin Rommel's command, to the chagrin of its commander,
General Max von Hartlieb. The same day, Erwin Rommel received
news that he had been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron
Cross the first divisional commander to be so honoured during
the campaign. This award, which had been secured for Erwin
Rommel at
Adolf
Hitler's behest, caused more animosity among fellow officers,
who were critical of Erwin Rommel's close relationship with
Adolf Hitler.
They believed that this was further evidence that
Adolf
Hitler seemed to give Erwin Rommel preferential treatment.
On 28 May, while making the final push into Lille and far
in front of friendly forces, 7th Panzer came under heavy fire
from French artillery. Erwin Rommel drove his forces on, capturing
Lille, trapping half of the French First Army, and preventing
their retreat to Dunkirk. After this coup, Erwin Rommel's
forces were again given time to rest.
Drive for the English Channel
Erwin Rommel, resuming his advance on 5 June, drove for the
River Seine to secure the bridges near Rouen. Advancing 100
kilometres (62 MI) in two days, the division reached Rouen
only to find the bridges destroyed. On 10 June, Erwin Rommel
reached the coast near Dieppe, sending his Am at coast
signal to the German HQ.
On 15 June, 7th Panzer started advancing on Cherbourg. On
17 June, the Division advanced 35 kilometres (22 MI), capturing
the town on the following day. The Division then proceeded
towards Bordeaux but stopped when the armistice was signed
on 21 June. In July, the Division was sent to the Paris area
to start preparations for Operation Seelöwe, Sea Lion
the planned invasion of Britain. The preparations were half-hearted,
however, as it soon became clear that the Luftwaffe would
not be able to secure air superiority over the Royal Air Force.
Ghost Division
7. Panzer-Division was later nicknamed Gespenster-Division
(the Ghost Division), because of the speed and
surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point
that even the German High Command at times lost track of its
whereabouts. It also set the record for the longest thrust
in one day by tanks up to that point, covering nearly 320
kilometres (200 MI).
Erwin Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics
during the French campaign. Many, such as General Georg Stumme,
who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed
with the speed and success of Erwin Rommel's drive however,
others were more reserved, some out of envy, others because
they felt Erwin Rommel took unnecessary risks.
Hermann
Hoth publicly expressed praise for Erwin Rommel's achievements
but had private reservations, saying in a confidential report
that Erwin Rommel should not be given command over a corps
unless he gained greater experience and a better sense
of judgement
Hermann
Hoth also accused Erwin Rommel of an unwillingness to
acknowledge the contributions of others to his victories.
The Fourth Army commander, General
Günther
von Kluge, also criticised Erwin Rommel for falsely claiming
all the glory for his achievements. Erwin Rommel did not,
Günther
von Kluge felt, acknowledge the contribution of the Luftwaffe,
and Erwin Rommel's manuscript describing his campaign in France
misrepresented the advances of neighbouring units to elevate
the achievements of his own dazzling advances.
Günther
von Kluge also cited the complaint by General Hartlieb
that Erwin Rommel had misappropriated 5th Panzer's bridging
tackle on 14 May after his own supplies had run out in order
to cross the Meuse, delaying 5th Panzer for several hours.
Erwin Rommel had repeated this procedure on 27 May at the
River Scarpe crossing.
North Africa 1941-1943
Erwin Rommel's reward for his success was to be promoted and
appointed commander of the 5th Light Division (later reorganised
and redesignated 21. Panzer-Division) and of the 15. Panzer-Division
which, as the Deutsches Afrikakorps, were sent to Libya in
early 1941 in Operation Sonnenblume to aid the demoralised
Italian troops which had suffered a heavy defeat from British
Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass. It was in Africa
where Erwin Rommel achieved his greatest fame as a commander.
First Axis offensive
His campaign in North Africa earned Erwin Rommel the nickname
The Desert Fox. On 6 February 1941 Erwin Rommel
was ordered to lead the Afrika Korps, sent to Italian Libya
to help shore up the Italian forces which had been driven
back during Operation Compass, launched by British Commonwealth
forces under Major-General Richard O'Connor during December
1940. Initially ordered to assume a defensive posture and
hold the front line, the Axis High Command had slated a limited
offensive towards Agedabia and Benghazi for May, planning
then to hold the line between those cities. Erwin Rommel argued
that such a limited offensive would be ineffective, as the
whole of Cyrenaica would have to be captured if the front
lines were to be held. The task of even holding the remaining
Italian possessions seemed daunting, as the Italians had only
7,000 troops remaining in the area after O'Connor's successful
capture of 130,000 prisoners and almost 400 tanks during the
previous three months of advance.
On 24 March 1941 Erwin Rommel launched a limited offensive
with only the 5th Light Division supported by two Italian
divisions. This thrust was to be minor, in anticipation of
Erwin Rommel receiving the 15th Panzer Division in May. The
British, who had been weakened by troops being withdrawn to
fight in the Battle of Greece, fell back to Mersa el Brega
and started constructing defensive works. Erwin Rommel decided
to continue the attack against these positions in order to
prevent the British from building up the fortifications. After
a day of fierce fighting, the Germans prevailed and the advance
continued as Erwin Rommel disregarded holding off the attack
on Agedabia until May. The British Commander-in-Chief Middle
East Command, General Archibald Wavell, overestimating the
strength of the Axis forces and already apprehensive about
the extent of his advances during the previous winter, ordered
a withdrawal from Benghazi in early April to avoid being cut
off by Erwin Rommel's thrust.
Erwin Rommel, seeing the British reluctance to fight a decisive
action, decided on a bold move: the seizure of the whole of
Cyrenaica despite having only light forces. He ordered the
Italian Ariete armoured division to pursue the retreating
British while the 5th Light Division was to move on Benghazi.
Generalmajor Johannes Streich, the 5th Light Division's commander,
protested this order on the grounds of the state of his vehicles,
but Erwin Rommel brushed the objections aside because, in
his words, One cannot permit unique opportunities to
slip by for the sake of trifles.The Italian Commander-in-Chief,
General Italo Gariboldi, tried repeatedly to halt Erwin Rommel's
advance but was unable to contact him.
After Benghazi had been secured following the British withdrawal,
Cyrenaica as far as Gazala was captured by 8 April. This was
despite fervent protests from Italian GHQ, which felt Erwin
Rommel was going beyond his orders, especially since he was
supposedly under Italian command. Erwin Rommel had received
orders from the German High Command that he was not to advance
past Maradah, but he turned a blind eye to this as well as
to protests from some of his staff and divisional commanders.
He believed he was grasping a great possibility to largely
destroy the Allied presence in North Africa and capture Egypt.
Erwin Rommel decided to keep up the pressure on the retreating
British and launched an outflanking offensive on the important
port of Tobruk during which he managed to capture on 9 April
the Military Governor of Cyrenaica, Lieutenant-General Philip
Neame as well as O'Connor, who at this time was his advisor.
With Italian forces attacking along the coast, Erwin Rommel
decided to sweep around to the south and attack the harbour
from the South-east with the 5th Light Division, hoping to
trap the bulk of the enemy force there. This outflanking could
not be carried out as rapidly as was necessary owing to logistical
problems from lengthening supply lines and spoiling flank
attacks from Tobruk, so Erwin Rommel's plan failed. By 11
April the envelopment of Tobruk was complete and the first
attack was launched. Other forces continued pushing east,
reaching Bardia and securing the whole of Libya by 15 April.
Siege of Tobruk
The following siege of Tobruk lasted 240 days, with the garrison
consisting of the Australian 9th Division under Lieutenant
General Leslie Morshead and reinforced by all the British
troops who had withdrawn to the port city, bringing the defenders
to a total of 25,000. Impatient to secure success, Erwin Rommel
launched repeated small-scale attacks. These were easily defeated
by the defenders. Erwin Rommel later criticised the Italian
High Command for failing to provide him with the blueprints
of the port's fortifications (which the Italians had built
before the war), but this was due to his surprising advance
so far beyond the agreed point, hardly allowing them time
to produce the plans. Reflecting on this period, General Heinrich
Kirchheim, then commander of the 5th Light Division, said:
I do not like to be reminded of that time because so
much blood was needlessly shed.Kirchheim had been reluctant
to launch further attacks on Tobruk, as the costs of earlier
assaults had been very high.
Erwin Rommel remained optimistic that success was imminent.
In his memoirs, he claimed that he immediately realised that
the enemy was determined to cling to Tobruk however, this
seems to be in doubt. In a letter to his wife dated 16 April,he
wrote that the enemy was already abandoning the town by sea,
and he remained confident that the enemy were not going to
defend the town until well into April. In reality, the ships
arriving at the port were not evacuating the defenders but
unloading supplies and even some reinforcements. A letter
of his written on 21 April,suggests that he was beginning
to realise this while the arrival of the Italian blueprints
of fortifications provided further grounds for discouragement.
Nonetheless, Erwin Rommel continued to insist that success
was imminent. His relations with his subordinate commanders
were at their nadir at this point, especially with Streich,
who was openly critical of Erwin Rommel's decisions and refused
to assume any responsibility for the attacks. Erwin Rommel
began holding a series of courts-martial, though ultimately
he signed almost none of the verdicts. This state of affairs
led Army Chief
Walther
von Brauchitsch to write to him that instead of making
threats and requesting the replacement of officers who hitherto
had excelled in battle, rather ... a calm and
constructive debate might bring better results. Erwin
Rommel remained unmoved.
At this point Erwin Rommel requested reinforcements for a
renewed attack, but the High Command, then completing preparations
for Operation Barbarossa, could not spare any. When Chief
of Staff General
Franz
Halder also told Erwin Rommel before the latter left for
Africa that a larger force could not be logistically sustained,
Erwin Rommel had responded that's your pigeon.
Now
Franz
Halder sarcastically commented: Now at last he is
constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently
strong to allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique
opportunities' offered by the overall situation. That is the
impression we have had for quite some time over here.Angry
that his order not to advance beyond Maradah had been disobeyed
and alarmed at mounting losses,
Franz
Halder, never an admirer of Erwin Rommel, dispatched
Friedrich
Paulus to (in
Franz
Halder's words) head off this soldier gone stark
mad.
Upon arrival on 27 April,
Friedrich
Paulus was initially persuaded to authorise yet another
attack on Tobruk. Back in Berlin,
Franz
Halder wrote: In my view it is a mistake but deferred
to
Friedrich
Paulus. When the attack, launched on 4 May, seemed to
turn into a disaster,
Friedrich
Paulus intervened and ordered it halted. In addition,
he now forbade Erwin Rommel from committing forces in any
new attack on Tobruk and further ordered that the attacks
were to halt until regrouping was completed. No new assault
was to take place without OKH's specific approval.
Erwin Rommel was furious with what he perceived as the lack
of fighting spirit in his commanders and Italian allies. However,
on the insistence of
Friedrich
Paulus and
Franz
Halder, he held off further attacks until the detailed
plans of the Tobruk defences could be obtained, the 15th Panzer
Division could be brought up to support the attack, and more
training of his troops in positional warfare could be conducted,For
Streich, however, it was too late. He was transferred from
command of 5th Light Division. When he met Erwin Rommel for
the last time as he was taking his leave, Erwin Rommel told
him that he had been too concerned for the well-being of your
troops Streich shot back: I can recognise no greater words
of praise, and a new quarrel ensued. After the decision was
made to hold off attacks on Tobruk for an indefinite period,
Erwin Rommel set about creating defensive positions, with
Italian infantry forces holding Bardia, the Sollum-Sidi Omar
line and investing Tobruk. The mobile German and Italian formations
were held in reserve to fight any British attacks from Egypt.
To this end, Halfaya Pass was secured, the high water mark
of Erwin Rommel's offensive. An elaborately prepared great
assault was scheduled for 21 November 1941, but this attack
never took place.
Whereas the defenders of Tobruk could be supplied by sea,
the logistical problems of the Afrika Korps greatly hampered
its operations, and a concentrated counterattack southwards
by the besieged Allies might have succeeded in reaching El
Adam and severing the lines of communication and supply of
the Axis forces at Bardia, Sollum and Halfya covering the
Egyptian border. General Morshead, however, was misled by
intelligence overestimates of the German forces investing
Tobruk, and so no major action was attempted.
General Wavell made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Tobruk
(Operation Brevity (launched on 15 May 1941) and Operation
Battleaxe (launched on 15 June 1941). Both operations were
easily defeated, as they were hastily prepared, partly owing
to Churchill's impatience for speedy action. During Brevity
the important Halfaya Pass was briefly recaptured by the British
but was lost again on 27 May. Battleaxe resulted in the loss
of 87 British for 25 German tanks in a four-day battle raging
on the flanks of the Sollum and Halfaya Passes, with the British
being unable to take these well-fortified positions.
In August, Erwin Rommel was appointed commander of the newly
created Panzer Group Africa. His previous command, the Afrika
Korps, comprising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light
Division, which by then had been redesignated 21st Panzer
Division, was put under command of Generalleutnant Ludwig
Crüwell, with Fritz Bayerlein as chief of staff. In addition
to the Afrika Korps, Erwin Rommel's Panzer Group had the 90th
Light Division and six Italian divisions, the Ariete and Trieste
Divisions forming the Italian XX Motorised Corps, three infantry
divisions investing Tobruk, and one holding Bardia.
Operation Crusader
Following the costly failure of Battleaxe, Wavell was replaced
by the Commander-in-Chief of India, General Claude Auchinleck.
Allied forces were reorganised and strengthened to two corps,
XXX and XIII, and became the British Eighth Army under the
command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck, having 770 tanks and
1,000 aircraft to support him, launched a major offensive
to relieve Tobruk (Operation Crusader) on 18 November 1941.
Erwin Rommel had two armoured divisions, the 15th and 21st
with a total of 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division,
and three Italian corps, five infantry and one armoured division
with 154 tanks, with which to oppose him.
The Eighth Army deeply outflanked the German defences along
the Egyptian frontier with a left hook through the desert,
and reached a position from which they could strike at both
Tobruk and the coastal road, the Via Balbia. Auchinleck
planned to engage the Afrika Korps with his armoured division,
while XXX Corps assaulted the Italian positions at Bardia,
encircling the troops there. But the British operational plan
had one major flaw. When XXX corps reached the area of Qabr
Salih, it was assumed that the Afrika Korps would attack eastward,
allowing the British to surround them with a southerly armour
thrust. Erwin Rommel, however, did not find it necessary to
do as the British planned, and instead attacked the southernly
armoured thrust at Sidi Rezegh.
Erwin Rommel was now faced with the decision of whether to
continue the planned attack on Tobruk in late May, trusting
his screening forces to hold off the advancing British, or
to reorient his forces to hit the approaching British columns.
He decided the risks were too great and called off the attack
on Tobruk.
The British armoured thrusts were largely defeated by fierce
resistance from antitank positions and tanks. The Italian
Ariete Armoured Division was forced to give ground while inflicting
heavy losses on the advancing British at Bir el Gobi, whereas
the 21st Panzer Division checked the attack launched against
them and counterattacked on Gabr Saleh. Over the next two
days the British continued pressing their attack, sending
their armoured brigades into battle in a piecemeal fashion,while
Erwin Rommel, aware of his numerical inferiority, launched
a concentrated attack on 23 November with all his armour.
The 21st Panzer Division held their defensive positions at
Sidi Rezegh, while 15th Panzer Division and the Italian Ariete
Division attacked the flanks and enveloped the British armour.
During this battle, among the biggest armoured battles of
the North African campaign, the British tanks were surrounded,
with about two-thirds destroyed and the survivors having to
fight themselves out of the trap and head south to Gabr Saleh.
Erwin Rommel's counterattacks
On 24 November Erwin Rommel, wanting to exploit the halt of
the British offensive, counterattacked into the British rear
areas in Egypt with the intention of exploiting the disorganisation
and confusion in the enemy's bases and cutting their supply
lines. Erwin Rommel considered the other, more conservative,
course of action of destroying the British forces halted before
Tobruk and Bardia too time consuming. Erwin Rommel knew his
forces were incapable of driving such an effort home, but
believed that the British, traumatised by their recent debacle,
would abandon their defences along the border at the appearance
of a German threat to their rear.
General Cunningham did, as Erwin Rommel had hoped, decide
to withdraw the Eighth Army to Egypt, but Auchinleck arrived
from Cairo just in time to cancel the withdrawal orders. The
German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks
remaining,stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening
resistance. The counterattack was criticised by the German
High Command and some of his staff officers as too dangerous
with Commonwealth forces still operating along the coast east
of Tobruk, and a wasteful attack as it bled his forces, in
particular his remaining tank force. Among the Staff officers
who were critical was Friedrich von Mellenthin, who said that
Unfortunately, Erwin Rommel overestimated his success
and believed the moment had come to launch a general pursuit.In
Erwin Rommel's favour, the attack very nearly succeeded: Cunningham
ordered a withdrawal, and only Auchinleck's timely intervention
prevented this.
Tobruk relieved, Axis retirement to El Agheila
While Erwin Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth
forces east of Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there.
Unable to reach Erwin Rommel for several days,Erwin Rommel's
Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Westphal, ordered the 21st
Panzer Division withdrawn to support the siege of Tobruk.
On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with
the defenders, and Erwin Rommel, having suffered losses that
could not easily be replaced, had to concentrate on retrieving
and regrouping the divisions that had attacked into Egypt.
By 6 December the Afrika Korps had averted the danger, and
on 7 December Erwin Rommel fell back to a defensive line at
Gazala, just west of Tobruk, all the while under heavy attacks
from the RAF. The Italian forces at Bardia and on the Egyptian
border were now cut off from the retreating Axis. The Allies,
briefly held up at Gazala, kept up the pressure to some degree,
although they were almost as exhausted and disorganised as
Erwin Rommel's force,and Erwin Rommel was forced to retreat
all the way back to the starting positions he had held in
March, reaching El Agheila on 30 December. His main concern
during his withdrawal was being flanked to the south, so the
Afrika Korps held the south flank during the retreat. The
Allies followed, but never attempted a southern flanking move
to cut off the retreating troops as they had done in 1940.
The German-Italian garrison at Bardia surrendered on 2 January
1942.
Recapture of Gazala
On 5 January 1942 the Afrika Korps received 55 tanks and new
supplies and Erwin Rommel started planning a counterattack.
On 21 January the attack was launched, which mauled the Allied
forces, costing them some 110 tanks and other heavy equipment.
The Axis forces retook Benghazi on 29 January, Timimi on 3
February, and the Allies pulled back to the Tobruk area and
commenced building defensive positions at Gazala.
During the confusion caused by the Crusader operation, Erwin
Rommel and his staff found themselves behind Allied lines
several times. On one occasion, he visited a New Zealand Army
field hospital that was still under Allied control. Erwin
Rommel inquired if anything was needed, promised the British
medical supplies and drove off unhindered.Eventually,
Erwin Rommel did supply the medical unit with some medical
equipment.
Second German offensive: Battle of Gazala
Following General
Albert
Kesselring's successes in creating local air superiority
and suppressing the Malta defenders in April 1942, an increased
flow of vital supplies reached the Panzer Armee Afrika. Previously
it had been receiving about a third of its needed supplies
for several months. With his forces thus strengthened, Erwin
Rommel began planning a major push for the summer. He felt
the very strong British positions around Gazala could be outflanked,
and he could then drive up behind them and destroy them. The
British were planning a summer offensive of their own and
their dispositions were more suited for an attack rather than
a defence.
The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new
Grant tanks, whereas Erwin Rommel's Panzer Army Africa commanded
a mere 320 German, 50 of which were the obsolete Panzer II
model, and 240 Italian tanks, which were no better than the
Panzer IIs. Therefore Erwin Rommel had to rely predominantly
on 88 mm guns to destroy the British heavy tanks, but even
these were in short supply. In infantry and artillery Erwin
Rommel found himself vastly outnumbered also, with many of
his units under-strength following the campaigns of 1941.
In contrast to the previous year, the Axis had more-or-less
air parity.
On 26 May 1942 Erwin Rommel's army attacked in a classic outflanking
Blitzkrieg operation in the Battle of Gazala. His Italian
infantry assaulted the Gazala fortifications head on, with
some armour attached to give the impressions that this was
the main assault, while all his motorised and armoured forces
outflanked the positions to the south. On the following morning
Erwin Rommel cut through the flank and attacked north, but
throughout the day a running armour battle occurred, where
both sides took heavy losses. The attempted encirclement of
the Gazala position failed and the Germans lost a third of
their heavy tanks. Renewing the attack on the morning of 28
May, Erwin Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying
separate units of the British armour. Heavy British counterattacks
forced Erwin Rommel to assume a defensive posture and not
pursue his original plan of a dash north for the coast. On
30 May he attacked eastwards to link with elements of Italian
X Corps which had cleared a path through the Allied minefields
to establish a line of supply. On 2 June 90th Light Division
and the Trieste Division surrounded and reduced the Allied
strong point at Bir Hakeim, capturing it on 11 June. With
his communications and the southern strong point of the British
line thus secured, Erwin Rommel attacked north again, forcing
the British back, relying on the minefields of the Gazala
lines to protect his left flank. On 14 June the British began
a headlong retreat eastwards, the so-called Gazala Gallop,
to avoid being completely cut off.
On 15 June Axis forces reached the coast eliminating any escape
for the Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions.
With this task completed, Erwin Rommel set off in pursuit
of the retreating Allied formations, aiming to capture Tobruk
while the enemy was confused and disorganised. Tobruk, isolated
and alone, was now all that stood between the Axis and Egypt.
The defenders were the 2nd South African Infantry Division
and some disorganised units recovering from the Gazala battle.
On 21 June, after a swift, coordinated and fierce combined
arms assault, the city surrendered along with its 33,000 defenders,
including most of the South African 2nd Division. Only at
the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British
Commonwealth troops been captured.
Adolf
Hitler made Erwin Rommel a Field Marshal for this victory.
By this time, Erwin Rommel's gains caused considerable alarm
in the Allied camp. He appeared to be poised to deliver a
crippling blow to the British by conquering Egypt. The Allies
feared Erwin Rommel would then turn northeastward to conquer
the valuable oil fields of the Middle East and then link up
with the German forces besieging the equally valuable Caucasian
oil fields. However, these required substantial reinforcements
that
Adolf
Hitler refused to allocate. Ironically,
Adolf
Hitler had been sceptical about sending Erwin Rommel to
Africa in the first place. He'd only done so after constant
begging by naval commander
Erich
Raeder, and even then only to relieve the Italians.
Adolf
Hitler never understood global warfare, despite
Erich
Raeder and Erwin Rommel's attempts to get him to see the
strategic value of Egypt.
Drive for Egypt
Erwin Rommel determined to press the attack on Mersa Matruh
despite the heavy losses he had suffered at Gazala and Tobruk.
He also wanted to prevent the British from establishing a
new front line, and felt the weakness of the British formations
had to be exploited by a thrust into Egypt. This decision
met with some criticism, as an advance into Egypt meant a
significant lengthening of the supply lines. It also meant
that a proposed attack on Malta would have to wait, as the
Luftwaffe would be required to support Erwin Rommel's drive
eastwards.
Albert
Kesselring strongly disagreed with Erwin Rommel's decision,
and went as far as threatening to withdraw his aircraft to
Sicily.
Adolf
Hitler agreed to Erwin Rommel's plan, despite protest
from Italian HQ and some of his staff officers, seeing the
potential for a complete victory in Africa. Erwin Rommel,
apparently aware of his growing reputation as a gambler, defended
his decision by claiming that merely to hold the lines at
Sollum would confer upon the British a distinct advantage,
in that they could more easily outflank the positions at Sollum
and the overseas supply lines would still have to be routed
via Tripoli unless he secured a front further east.
On 22 June Erwin Rommel continued his offensive eastwards
and initially little resistance was encountered. Apart from
fuel shortages, the advance continued until Mersa Matruh was
encircled on 26 June, surrounding four infantry divisions.
One of the divisions managed to break out during the night,
and over the next two days some elements of the remaining
three divisions also slipped away. The fortress fell on 29
June, yielding enormous amounts of supplies and equipment,
in addition to 6,000 POWs.
On 25 June Auchinleck had assumed direct command of Eighth
Army and decided to form his main defensive line at El Alamein,
where the proximity to the south of the Qattara Depression
created a relatively short line to defend which could not
be outflanked to the south because of the impossibility of
moving armour into and through the depression. Erwin Rommel
continued his march eastwards, but with the supply situation
steadily worsening and his men exhausted after five weeks
of constant warfare, the offensive on El Alamein seemed in
doubt. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein started, but
after almost a month of inconclusive fighting both sides,
completely exhausted, dug in, halting Erwin Rommel's drive
eastwards. This was a serious blow to Erwin Rommel who had
hoped to drive his advance into the open desert beyond El
Alamein where he could conduct a mobile defence.
More significantly, Erwin Rommel only had 13 operational tanks
by the time he reached El Alamein. Although he was only a
few hundred miles from the Pyramids, he knew he didn't have
the resources to push forward. On 3 July, he wrote in his
diary that his momentum had faded away.
Allied attack: Second Battle of El Alamein
After the stalemate at El Alamein, Erwin Rommel hoped to go
on the offensive again before massive amounts of men and material
could reach the British Eighth Army. Allied forces from Malta
were, however, intercepting his supplies at sea and the Desert
Air Force kept up a relentless campaign against Axis supply
vessels in Tobruk, Bardia and Mersa Matruh. Most of the supplies
reaching the Axis troops still had to be landed at Benghazi
and Tripoli, and the enormous distances supplies had to travel
to reach the forward troops meant that a rapid resupply and
reorganisation of the Axis army could not be done. Further
hampering Erwin Rommel's plans was the fact that the Italian
divisions received priority on supplies, with the Italian
authorities shipping material for the Italian formations at
a much higher rate than for German formations. It seems the
Italian HQ was uneasy with Erwin Rommel's ambitions and wanted
their own forces, whom they at least had some control over,
resupplied first.
The British, themselves preparing for a renewed drive, replaced
Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander.
The Eighth Army also got a new commander, Bernard Montgomery.
They received a steady stream of supplies and were able to
reorganise their forces. In late August they received a large
convoy carrying over 100,000 tons of supplies, and Erwin Rommel,
learning of this, felt that time was running out. Erwin Rommel
decided to launch an attack with the 15th and 21st Panzer
Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian XX motorised
Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the El Alamein
lines. The terrain here was without any easily defensible
features and so open to attack. Montgomery and Auchinleck
before him had realised this threat, and the main defences
for this sector had been set up behind the El Alamein line
along the Alam El Halfa Ridge, where any outflanking thrust
could be more easily met from overlooking defensive positions.
Battle of Alam El Halfa
The Battle of Alam El Halfa was launched on 30 August, with
Erwin Rommel's forces driving through the south flank. After
passing the El Alamein line to the south, Erwin Rommel drove
north at the Alam El Halfa Ridge, just as Montgomery had anticipated.
Under heavy fire from British artillery and aircraft, and
in the face of well prepared positions that Erwin Rommel could
not hope to outflank due to lack of fuel, the attack stalled.
By 2 September, Erwin Rommel realised the battle was unwinnable,
and decided to withdraw.
Montgomery had prepared to pursue the Germans but in the afternoon
of 2 September, he gave Corps commander Brian Horrocks clear
orders to allow the enemy to retire. This was for two reasons:
to preserve his own strength and to allow the enemy to observe,
and be misled by, the dummy preparations for an attack in
the area. Nevertheless, Montgomery was keen to inflict casualties
on the enemy and orders were given for the as yet inexperienced
2nd New Zealand Division, positioned to the north of the retreating
Axis forces, and 7th Armoured Division to attack on 3 September.
The attack was repelled, however, by a fierce rearguard action
by the 90th Light Division and Montgomery called off further
action to preserve his strength. On 5 September Erwin Rommel
was back where he had started, with only heavy losses to show
for it. Erwin Rommel had suffered 2,940 casualties, lost 50
tanks, a similar number of guns and, perhaps worst of all,
400 trucks, vital for supplies and movement. The British losses,
except tank losses of 68, were much less, further adding to
the numerical inferiority of Panzer Army Afrika. The Desert
Air Force inflicted the highest proportions of damage to Erwin
Rommel's forces. He now realised the war in Africa was unwinnable
without more air support which was impossible since the Luftwaffe
was already stretched to breaking point on other fronts.
Second Battle of El Alamein
In September British raiding parties attacked important harbours
and supply points. The flow of supplies successfully ferried
across the Mediterranean had fallen to a dismal level. Some
two-thirds of the supplies embarked for Africa were destroyed
at sea. In addition, Erwin Rommel's health was failing and
he took sick leave in Italy and Germany from late September.
Thus he was not present when the Second Battle of El Alamein
began on 23 October 1942. Although he returned immediately,
it took him two vital days to reach his HQ in Africa. The
defensive plan at El Alamein was more static in nature than
Erwin Rommel preferred, but with shortages of motorised units
and fuel, he had felt it was the only possible plan. The defensive
line had strong fortifications and was protected with a large
minefield which in turn was covered with machine guns and
artillery. This, Erwin Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry
to hold the line at any point until motorised and armoured
units in reserve could move up and counterattack any Allied
breaches.
General Georg Stumme was in command in Erwin Rommel's absence
but during the initial fighting he died of a heart attack.
This paralysed the German HQ until General Ritter von Thoma
took command. After returning, Erwin Rommel learned that the
fuel supply situation, critical when he left in September,
was now disasters. Counterattacks by the 15th and 21st Panzer
Divisions on 24 October and 25 October had incurred heavy
tank losses due to the intensity of the British artillery
and air attack. Erwin Rommel's main concern was to counterattack
in full force and throw the British out of the defensive lines,
which was in his view the only chance the Axis had of avoiding
defeat. The counterattack was launched early on 26 October
but the British units that had penetrated the defensive line
inflicted heavy losses on Erwin Rommel's armour at the position
code-named Snipe (often mis named Kidney Ridge due to faulty
interpretation of the ring contour it was actually a depression).
The Allies continued pushing hard with armoured units to force
the breakthrough, but the defenders' fire destroyed many tanks,
leading to doubts among the officers in the British armoured
brigades about the chances of clearing a breach.
Montgomery, seeing his armoured brigades losing tanks at an
alarming rate, stopped major attacks until 2 November when
he launched Operation Supercharge and achieved a 4 kilometres
(2.5 MI) penetration of the line. Erwin Rommel immediately
counterattacked with what tanks he had available in an attempt
to encircle the pocket during 2 November, but the heavy Allied
fire stopped the attempt. By this time Panzer Army Africa
had only one-third of its initial strength remaining, with
only 35 tanks left operational, virtually no fuel or ammunition
and with the British in complete command of the air.
Erwin Rommel's retreat
On 3 November Montgomery found it impossible to renew his
attack, and he had to wait for more reinforcements to be brought
up. This lull was what Erwin Rommel needed for his withdrawal,
which had been planned since 29 October, when he had determined
the situation hopeless. At midday, however, Erwin Rommel received
the infamous victory or death stand-fast order
from
Adolf
Hitler. Although this order demanded the impossible and
virtually ensured the destruction of Panzer Army Africa, Erwin
Rommel could not bring himself to disobey a direct order from
his Führer. The Axis forces held on desperately.
On 4 November Montgomery renewed the attack with fresh forces,
and with almost 500 tanks against the 20 or so remaining to
Erwin Rommel. By midday the Italian XX motorised Corps was
surrounded, and several hours later was completely destroyed.
This left a 20 km gap in Erwin Rommel's line, with British
armoured and motorised units pouring through, threatening
the entire Panzer Army Africa with encirclement At this point
Erwin Rommel could no longer uphold the no-retreat order and
ordered a general retreat. Early on 5 November he received
authorisation by
Adolf
Hitler to withdraw, 12 hours after his decision to do
so but it was far too late, with only remnants of his army
streaming westward. Most of his unmotorised forces (the bulk
of the army) were caught.
Part of the Panzer Army Africa escaped from El Alamein, but
this remnant took heavy losses from constant air attacks.
Despite urgings from
Adolf
Hitler and Mussolini, the Panzer Army did not turn to
fight, except for brief holding actions, but withdrew under
Allied pressure all the way to Tunisia. However, the retreat
was conducted most skilfully, employing scorched earth tactics
and leaving behind booby traps, making the task of the pursuers
very difficult. The Allied forces had great numerical superiority
and air supremacy, while most of Erwin Rommel's remaining
divisions were reduced to combat groups.
End of Africa campaigns
Having reached Tunisia, Erwin Rommel launched an attack against
the U.S. II Corps which was threatening to cut his lines of
supply north to Tunis. Erwin Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat
on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass in February.
Erwin Rommel immediately turned back against the British forces,
occupying the Mareth Line (old French defences on the Libyan
border). But Erwin Rommel could only delay the inevitable.
At the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe
had been appointed the new commander of Erwin Rommel's Panzer
Army Africa while Erwin Rommel had been at Kasserine, which
was renamed the Italo-German Panzer Army (in recognition of
the fact that it consisted of one German and three Italian
corps). Though Messe replaced Erwin Rommel, he diplomatically
deferred to him, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically
the same command. On 23 February Armeegruppe Afrika was created
with Erwin Rommel in command. It included the Italo-German
Panzer Army under Messe (renamed 1st Italian Army) and the
German 5th Panzer Army in the north of Tunisia under General
Hans-Jürgen
von Arnim.
The last Erwin Rommel offensive in North Africa was on 6 March
1943, when he attacked Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine.
The attack was made with 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions.
Warned by Ultra intercepts, Montgomery deployed large numbers
of anti-tank guns in the path of the offensive. After losing
52 tanks, Erwin Rommel called off the assault. On 9 March
he handed over command of Armeegruppe Afrika to General
Hans-Jürgen
von Arnim and left Africa, because of health reasons,
never to return. On 13 May 1943, General Messe surrendered
the remnants of Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies.
Some historians contrast Erwin Rommel's withdrawal to Tunisia
against
Adolf
Hitler's wishes with
Friedrich
Paulus's obedience of orders to have the German Sixth
Army stand its ground at the Battle of Stalingrad which resulted
in its annihilation. Field Marshal
Albert
Kesselring's, appointed overall Axis commander in North
Africa, saw things differently. He believed the withdrawals,
some of which were carried out against his orders, unnecessary
and ruinous since they brought forward British airfields ever
closer to the port of Tunis. As far as he was concerned, Erwin
Rommel was an insubordinate defeatist and string puller The
increasingly acrimonious relations between the two did nothing
to enhance performance.
Role of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in North Africa
The Axis had some major SIGINT successes in North Africa.
They intercepted the reports of the U.S. Military attaché
in Egypt, who was briefed by the British on their forces and
plans. Some authorities believe this information explains
much of Erwin Rommel's success.
In addition, the Afrika Korps had a Radio Intercept Section
(RIS) attached to its HQ. The RIS monitored radio communications
among British units. The British were very gabby
and most of this chatter was in clear, that is, uncoded, allowing
the Germans to more easily identify British units and deployments.
During the first Battle of El Alamein, a British counter-attack
reached the German HQ. The RIS was wiped out in the fighting
and many of their files captured. This alerted the British
to the problem, and they tightened up on radio chatter. The
loss of this resource is considered an important factor in
Erwin Rommel's later lack of success
Allied codebreakers read much enciphered German message traffic,
especially that encrypted with the Enigma machine. This Ultra
intelligence included daily reports from Africa on the numbers
and condition of Axis forces. It also included information
about Axis supply shipments across the Mediterranean. This
information enabled the weak Allied air and naval forces there
to intercept and destroy much of these shipments. To protect
the source of the intelligence (ULTRA), Allied air and naval
forces were forbidden to destroy the convoys carrying war
supplies to North Africa until a flyover to discover
the convoy was arranged and completed.
France 1943-1944
The inglorious end of the North African campaign meshed poorly
with the Nazi propaganda machine's relentless portrayal of
Erwin Rommel as an unbeatable military genius. This opened
in Berlin the awkward question of precisely what use now to
make of the erstwhile Desert Fox. Back in Germany he was for
some time virtually unemployed. On 23 July 1943 he moved to
Greece as commander of Heeresgruppe E (Army Group E) to defend
the Greek coast against a possible Allied landing that never
happened, and which the Germans were led to expect due to
the elaborate British deception plan known as Operation Mincemeat
only to return to Germany two days later upon the overthrow
of Mussolini. On 17 August 1943 Erwin Rommel moved his headquarters
from Munich to Lake Garda as commander of a new Heeresgruppe
B (Army Group B) created to defend northern Italy.
After
Adolf
Hitler gave
Albert
Kesselring sole Italian command, on 21 November, Erwin
Rommel moved Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) to Normandy in
France with responsibility for defending the French coast
against the long anticipated Allied invasion. He was dismayed
by the lack of completed works and the slow building pace
and feared he had just months before an invasion. Erwin Rommel
reinvigorated the fortification effort along the Atlantic
coast. The Commander-in-Chief West,
Gerd
von Rundstedt, expected the Allies to invade in the Pas-de-Calais
because it was the shortest crossing point from Britain, its
port facilities were essential to supplying a large invasion
force, and the distance from Calais to Germany was relatively
short.
Adolf
Hitler's HQ, although agreeing with this assessment, also
considered a landing at Normandy as a possibility. Erwin Rommel,
believing that Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground,
argued that it did not matter to the Allies where they landed,
just that the landing was successful. He therefore toured
the Normandy defences extensively in January and February
1944. He ordered millions of mines laid and thousands of tank
traps and obstacles set up on beaches and throughout the countryside,
including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings,
the so-called Erwin Rommels pargel (Erwin Rommel's
After his experience with Allied air superiority at the end
of the North Africa campaign, Erwin Rommel concluded that
future Allied offensives would also enjoy overwhelming Allied
air superiority, exposing any German armoured counter movements
to severe punishment from above. He argued that the tank forces
should be dispersed in small units and kept in heavily fortified
positions as close to the front as possible. In doing so they
would not have to move far and en masse when the invasion
started. He felt their best chance was to confront the invading
force immediately and drive it into the sea. However,
Gerd
von Rundstedt felt that there was no way to stop the invasion
near the beaches due to the equally overwhelming firepower
of the Allied navies. He felt the German armour should be
held in reserve well inland near Paris where they could be
used to counter attack in force in a more traditional military
doctrine. The allies could even be allowed to extend themselves
deep into France, exposing their flanks for a pincer movement
to cut off the supplies and retreat of the Allied troops.
This notion of defending France was supported by other officers,
most notably
Heinz
Guderian and Panzer Group West commander
Leo
Geyr von Schweppenburg, who strongly disagreed with Erwin
Rommel and wanted the armour placed far inland.
When asked to pick a plan,
Adolf
Hitler vacillated. In late April, he ordered them placed
in the middle, far enough inland to be useless to Erwin Rommel
but not far enough for
Gerd
von Rundstedt. Erwin Rommel did move some of the armoured
formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering
General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending
the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the front-line
The Allies staged elaborate deceptions for D-Day (see Operation
Fortitude), giving the impression that the landings would
be at Calais. Although
Adolf
Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while,
Erwin Rommel and most Wehrmacht commanders in France also
started believing in a Pas-de-Calais landing. Erwin Rommel
concentrated fortification building in the River Somme estuary
and let the work in Normandy lag. By D-Day on 6 June 1944
virtually all German officers, including
Adolf
Hitler's staff, firmly believed that Pas-de-Calais was
going to be the invasion site.
During the confusing opening hours of D-Day, the German command
structure in France was in disarray. Erwin Rommel, and several
other important officers were on leave. Several tank units,
notably the 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer-Lehr-Division,
were close enough to the beaches to create serious havoc.
The absence of Erwin Rommel and continued confusion in the
army and theatre HQs led to hesitation in releasing the armoured
reserves to Normandy when they might be needed to meet a second
invasion further north. Facing only small-scale German attacks,
the Allies quickly secured a beachhead. According to the official
history of the SAS, a British sniper could have killed Erwin
Rommel, but was ordered not to, because by that time the allies
understood the German's mind and felt they could anticipate
his strategies but not that of his unknown successor. Erwin
Rommel personally oversaw the bitter fighting around Caen
where only the determined defence of Kampfgruppe von Luck
prevented a British breakout on the first day. Here, again,
the on-site commanders were denied freedom of action and the
Germans did not launch a concentrated counterattack until
midday on 6 June.
The Allies pushed ashore and expanded their beachhead despite
the best efforts of Erwin Rommel's troops. By mid-July the
German position was crumbling. On 17 July 1944, Erwin Rommel
was being driven along a French road near the front in his
staff car. According to a widely accepted version of events,
an RCAF Spitfire of 412 Squadron piloted by Charley Fox strafed
the car near Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery and Erwin Rommel was
injured. He was hospitalised with major head injuries. In
a different version, a patrol of 602 Squadron led by Chris
Le Roux carried out the attack. Australian Fred Cowlph, of
squadron 453, also claims he shot up the Horch carrying Erwin
Rommel, . He claims his camera that activated automatically
on firing his cannons verified this. He recorded this action
in his aircraft log book.
Plot against Adolf Hitler
There had always been opposition to
Adolf
Hitler in conservative circles and in the Army, the Schwarze
Kapelle (Black Orchestra), but
Adolf
Hitler's dazzling successes in 1938 to 1941 had stifled
it. However, after the Russian campaign failed, and the Axis
suffered more defeats, this opposition underwent a revival.
Early in 1944, three of Erwin Rommel's closest friends , the
Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart, SA Brigadeführer
Karl Strölin (who had served with Erwin Rommel in the
First World War), Alexander von Falkenhausen and Carl Heinrich
von Stülpnagel began efforts to bring Erwin Rommel into
the conspiracy. They felt that as by far the most popular
officer in Germany, he would lend their cause badly needed
credibility with the populace. Additionally, the conspirators
felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active
duty. Erwin von Witzleben, who would have become commander-in-chief
of the Wehrmacht if
Adolf
Hitler had been overthrown, was a field marshal, but had
not been on active duty since 1942. Sometime in February,
Erwin Rommel agreed to lend his support to the conspiracy
in order to, as he put it, come to the rescue of Germany.
Erwin Rommel, however, opposed assassinating
Adolf
Hitler. After the war, his widow among others maintained
that Erwin Rommel believed an assassination attempt would
spark civil war in Germany and Austria and
Adolf
Hitler would have become a martyr for a lasting cause.
Instead, Erwin Rommel insisted that
Adolf
Hitler be arrested and brought to trial for his crimes.
By the time of his head injuries, Erwin Rommel had made up
his mind to do his part to get rid of
Adolf
Hitler.
After the failed bomb attack of 20 July, many conspirators
were arrested and the dragnet expanded to anyone even suspected
of participating. Erwin Rommel was fairly perturbed at this
development, telling Hans Speidel that
Adolf
Hitler's behaviour after the attack proved that the dictator
had gone completely mad. It did not take long,
however, for Erwin Rommel's involvement to come to light.
His name was first mentioned when Stülpnagel blurted
it out after a botched suicide attempt. Later, another conspirator,
Caesar von Hofacker, admitted under particularly severe Gestapo
torture that Erwin Rommel was actively involved.
Additionally, Carl Goerdeler, the main civilian leader of
the Resistance, wrote on several letters and other documents
that Erwin Rommel was a potential supporter and an acceptable
military leader to be placed in a position of responsibility
should their coup succeed. National Socialist Party officials in France
reported that Erwin Rommel extensively and scornfully criticised
Nazi incompetence and crimes.
Erwin Rommel's death
The Court of Military Honour a drumhead court-martial
convened to decide the fate of officers involved in the conspiracy
included two men with whom Erwin Rommel had crossed swords
before:
Heinz
Guderian and
Gerd
von Rundstedt. The Court decided that Erwin Rommel should
be expelled from the Army in disgrace and brought before Roland
Freisler's People's Court, a kangaroo court that always decided
in favour of the prosecution. However,
Adolf
Hitler knew that having Erwin Rommel branded as a traitor
would severely damage morale on the home front. He and Keitel
thus decided to offer Erwin Rommel a chance to commit suicide.
Erwin Rommel was approached at his home by
Wilhelm
Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel, two generals from
Adolf
Hitler's headquarters, on 14 October 1944.
Wilhelm
Burgdorf informed him of the charges and offered him a
choice: he could face the People's Court or choose to commit
suicide quietly. In the former case, his staff would have
been arrested and his family would suffer even before the
all-but-certain conviction and execution. In the latter case,
the government would assure his family full pension payments
and a state funeral claiming he had died a hero.
Wilhelm
Burgdorf had brought a capsule of cyanide for the occasion.
After a few minutes alone, Erwin Rommel announced that he
chose to end his own life and explained his decision to his
wife and son. Carrying his field marshal's baton, Erwin Rommel
went to
Wilhelm
Burgdorf's Opel, driven by SS Master Sergeant Heinrich
Doose, and was driven out of the village. Doose walked away
from the car leaving Erwin Rommel with Maisel. Five minutes
later
Wilhelm
Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the car,
and Doose noticed that Erwin Rommel was slumped over, after
taking the cyanide pill. Doose, while sobbing, replaced Erwin
Rommel's fallen cap on his head. Ten minutes later the group
phoned Erwin Rommel's wife to inform her that Erwin Rommel
was dead.
After the war, an edited version of his diary was published
as The Erwin Rommel Papers. He is the only member of the Third
Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him. His
grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of
Ulm.
The official story of Erwin Rommel's death, as initially reported
to the general public, stated that Erwin Rommel had either
suffered a heart attack or succumbed to his injuries from
the earlier strafing of his staff car. To further strengthen
the story,
Adolf
Hitler ordered an official day of mourning in commemoration
and Erwin Rommel was buried with full military honours.
Adolf
Hitler sent Field Marshal
Gerd
von Rundstedt as his representative at Erwin Rommel's
funeral. Erwin Rommel had specified that no political paraphernalia
were to be displayed on his corpse, but the Nazis made sure
he was fully festooned with swastikas. The truth behind Erwin
Rommel's death did not come out until Field Marshal Keitel
testified about it during the Nuremberg Trials.
Erwin Rommel's style as military commander
Logistics and strategy
Erwin Rommel was a skilled tactician, but some allege that
he had little sense of logistics or military strategy. They
consider as an example of this his proposal to postpone Operation
Herkules, the invasion of Malta in favour of the immediate
advance to the Suez Canal, which would cut the island off
from the western Mediterranean. In the event, the operation
did not take place, and he ran out of supplies in Egypt, principally
because Malta-based forces were sinking Axis supply ships.
Those that allege that Erwin Rommel had little sense of logistics
think that his eagerness to drive for Egypt, when the necessary
logistical support was lacking, meant that these drives ultimately
failed with great losses.
In his analysis of the logistical aspects of the North African
Campaign, military historian Martin van Creveld wrote:
Given that the Wehrmacht was only partly motorised and unsupported
by a really strong motor industry that the political situation
necessitated the carrying of much useless Italian ballast
that the capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, the distances
to be mastered so vast it seems clear that, for all of Erwin
Rommel's tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an
Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble.
Erwin Rommel's repeated defiance of his orders and attempts
to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases, however,
was mistaken and should never have been tolerated.
Personality
Contemporaries who had to work with him under adversity often
had very few kind words to say about him and his abilities.
Following
Friedrich
Paulus' return from his inspection of Erwin Rommel's doings
in North Africa and also considering the reports submitted
by Alfred Gause,
Franz
Halder concluded: Erwin Rommel's character defects
make him very hard to get along with but no one cares to come
out in open opposition because of his brutality and the backing
he has at top level. Others mentioned his leadership
style, which expected much of his commanders, while not being
open to criticism or objections. He had little patience for
sub-commanders who did not do their jobs properly. Only three
weeks after assuming command of the 7th Panzer Division in
February 1940, Erwin Rommel found a battalion commander performing
below par and had the man relieved of command and sent on
his way in 90 minutes. This management style would certainly
send a signal that he demanded the utmost of his men, but
it was bound to create a feeling of resentment among some
of his officers.
F. W. von Mellenthin, who served on Erwin Rommel's staff during
the Africa campaign, wrote that Erwin Rommel took great chances
on several occasions, gambling entire battles on decisions
made almost on the spur of the moment and with incomplete
information. He cited Erwin Rommel's counterattack during
Operation Crusader as just one such instance. Others who served
under him in Africa, most notably General Fritz Bayerlein,
said he took risks but only after carefully weighing the potential
dangers and rewards. Erwin Rommel himself was aware of his
growing reputation as a gambler and added careful notes in
his papers explaining and defending his actions, especially
concerning his decision to drive into Egypt during the 1942
Summer Offensive.
While some aggressive subordinates, like Hans von Luck, praised
his leadership from the front,Mellenthin questioned this leadership
style as it often led to diss involvement of his staff officers
in the fight instead of their maintaining an overview of the
situation. His consequential long absences from HQ also meant
that subordinates had to make decisions without consulting
Erwin Rommel, leading to confusion.
Erwin Rommel was a teetotaller and a non-smoker.
Relations with the Italians
Erwin Rommel's relations with the Italian High Command in
North Africa were in the worst possible terms. That is hardly
surprising, as Erwin Rommel was nominally subordinate to the
Italians for much of the campaign but was also direct commander
of the DAK, by far the strongest component of the Axis forces,
and enjoyed direct access and the strongest relationships
with the highest German political authority. This allowed
him to ignore blatantly any sort of order or even simple advice
coming from his Italian counterparts, and Erwin Rommel's abrasive
and often impolite manners did nothing to smooth the resentment
that this perceived insubordination and lack of respect generated
in his Italian allies.
The belated expedient to nominate Field Marshall
Albert
Kesselring as Supreme Commander Mediterranean, to act
as a buffer between Erwin Rommel and the Italians, failed
miserably, as Erwin Rommel quite simply ignored
Albert
Kesselring exactly as he ignored the Italians.
Besides Erwin Rommel's impolite manners and insubordination,
there were also strong professional points of disagreements,
mostly related to the handling of the logistical part of the
campaign. While certainly much less proficient than Erwin
Rommel in their tactical outlook and mobile warfare skills,
the Italian commanders were competent old school professionals,
with full staff training and a sound grasp of logistics and
artillery doctrine, that is the true weak points of Erwin
Rommel professional preparation. As such the Italian commanders
were repeatedly at odds with Erwin Rommel, particularly when
their conservative logistical calculations regularly ignored
by Erwin Rommel were actually confirmed as accurate, leaving
the Axis forces stranded in exposed position from where the
Italians with their puny motorised resources were much less
able than the Germans to extricate themselves.
This generated a widespread lack of respect among the Italian
commanders for Erwin Rommel's professional skills in anything
but tactical situation, that further ruined any possibility
of implementing good working relations. This lack of trust
reached its acme during the retreat up to Tunisia after the
El Alamein battle, when an utterly spent and dispirited Erwin
Rommel eluded all requests by the Italians to stand up and
attempt to fight in defence of Libya on the favourable traditional
back-up line at the El Agheila bottleneck or even before the
main logistical base of Tripoli, a fact that the Italian commanders
did consider just short of outright cowardice and treason.
Much different was the perception of Erwin Rommel among the
Italian common soldiers and lower officers, that reserved
for him the highest sort of admiration and respect.
Aggression and tactical capability
In France, Erwin Rommel's aggressive drive through the French
and British lines, disregarding the safety of his flanks and
rear, succeeded to a remarkable degree. His bold attacks often
caused larger enemy formations to surrender, but his aggressiveness
did cause resentment among fellow officers, who felt he at
times acted too recklessly and failed to keep his sub-commanders
and colleague commanders properly informed of his intentions.
He was also criticised for claiming too much of the glory
himself, neglecting support from other elements of the Wehrmacht
and downplaying other units' achievements.
British General Harold Alexander commanded Allied forces in
the Middle East facing Erwin Rommel in Egypt from August 1942
and later commanded 18th Army Group in Tunisia. In his official
despatch on the campaign in Africa, he wrote of Erwin Rommel
He was a tactician of the greatest ability, with a firm grasp
of every detail of the employment of armour in action, and
very quick to seize the fleeting opportunity and the critical
turning point of a mobile battle. I felt certain doubts, however,
about his strategic ability, in particular as to whether he
fully understood the importance of a sound administrative
plan. Happiest while controlling a mobile force directly under
his own eyes he was liable to overexploit immediate success
without sufficient thought for the future. Sir David Hunt,
one of Alexander's intelligence officers, expressed the view
in his own book that:
His real gift was for commanding an armoured regiment, perhaps
a division, and that his absolute ceiling was an armoured
corps. During the siege of Tobruk, Erwin Rommel launched frequent
costly attacks during the first month of the siege. The level
of losses incurred caused Erwin Rommel to have several arguments
with his unit commanders, and also with the German High Command.
Indeed, some sources indicate that Chief of Staff
Franz
Halder had to send
Friedrich
Paulus to Africa to rein Erwin Rommel in, although Erwin
Rommel himself maintained he had realised the futility of
further attacks on the fortress on his own accord.
Popular perception
Erwin Rommel was extraordinarily well known in his lifetime,
not only by the German people, but also by his adversaries.
Popular stories of his chivalry and tactical prowess earned
him the respect of many opponents, including Claude Auchinleck,
Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery.
Erwin Rommel reciprocated their respect for instance, he said
Montgomery never made a serious strategic mistake and credited
Patton with the most astounding achievement in mobile warfare.
Adolf Hitler
counted Erwin Rommel among his favourite generals. Erwin Rommel
was among the few Axis commanders others being Isoroku Yamamoto
and
Reinhard
Heydrich directly targeted for assassination by Allied
planners. However, unlike the other two, the attempt on Erwin
Rommel's life was a failure.
The Afrika Korps were never accused of any war crimes, and
Erwin Rommel himself referred to the fighting in North Africa
as Krieg ohne Hass war without hate. Numerous examples exist
of Erwin Rommel's chivalry towards Allied POWs, such as his
defiance of
Adolf
Hitler's infamous Commando Order following the capture
of Lt. Roy Woodridge and Lt. George Lane as part of Operation
Fortitude. He also refused to comply with
Adolf
Hitler's order to execute Jewish POWs.
During Erwin Rommel's time in France,
Adolf
Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population
Erwin Rommel disobeyed. Several times he wrote letters protesting
against the treatment of the Jews. When British Major Geoffrey
Keyes was killed during a failed commando raid to kill or
capture Erwin Rommel behind German lines, Erwin Rommel ordered
him buried with full military honours. Also, during the construction
of the Atlantic Wall, Erwin Rommel directed that French workers
were not to be used as slaves, but were to be paid for their
labour.
His military colleagues also played their part in perpetuating
his legend. His former subordinate Kircheim, though privately
critical of Erwin Rommel's performance, nonetheless explained:
thanks to propaganda, first by
Joseph
Goebbels, then by Montgomery, and finally, after he was
poisoned (sic), by all former enemy powers, he has become
a symbol of the best military traditions. Any public criticism
of this legendary personality would damage the esteem in which
the German soldier is held.
After the war, when Erwin Rommel's alleged involvement in
the plot to kill
Adolf
Hitler became known, his stature was enhanced greatly
among the former Allied nations. Erwin Rommel was often cited
in Western sources as a general who, though a loyal German,
was willing to stand up to
Adolf
Hitler. The release of the film The Desert Fox: The Story
of Erwin Rommel (1951) helped to further enhance his reputation
as one of the most widely known and well-regarded leaders
in the German Army. In 1970 a Lütjens-class destroyer
was named the Erwin Rommel in his honour.
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